E-mail: vijay@anglo-sphere.com

Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological and chemical, its prevention and future

Nothing could have anything like the impact of a nuclear explosion, which could be more physically damaging, psychologically shocking, and politically disruptive than any event since World War II. Although the casualties from a single act of nuclear terrorism might not match those of a nuclear war, they would still dwarf other forms of terrorism by many orders of magnitude and could easily exceed those of most conventional wars.'

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 brought home the willingness of a new breed of terrorists, now sometimes called 'new terrorists', to kill as many people as possible and cause the maximum amount of social and economic disruption. To discuss future terrorism it is useful and important to distinguish between the 'old' terrorists, who are likely to continue with 'business as usual', using conventional weapons to 'kill one and frighten thousands', and the 'new terrorists', who aim to 'kill thousands to frighten the hemisphere' with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Different types of 'old' terrorism can be identified:

• Political terrorism, usually with separatist or nationalist aims;

• Terrorism by far right- and left-wing political groups;

• Terrorism by single-issue groups, such as right-to-lifers and radical environmentalists; and

• Terrorism by an individual.

Current trends suggest that political terrorism with separatist or nationalist aims is likely to decrease in the future and terrorism by single-issue groups is likely to remain roughly constant, but the other types of terrorism are likely to increase.

Terrorist actions by the 'new' terrorists - religious fundamentalists, particularly Islamic Fundamentalist groups and American Christian white supremacists - are likely to become increasingly frequent and violent. Whereas secular terrorists are likely to exercise constraint, and to avoid killing many when killing a few suits their purposes, religious fundamentalists are unlikely to feel any moral constraint about killing very large numbers of people.

In fact, mass killing by WMDs may fit well into the Armageddon and apocalyptic visions of some religious groups, some of which believe that they are under divine instruction to maximize killing and destruction. The likelihood that terrorist violence by fundamentalist groups will escalate to indiscriminate mass killing is the greatest future terrorist risk, the main consequence of increasing religious terror and decreasing radical political terror.

The best way the new terrorists can achieve their objective is to use a WMD. There is, therefore, clearly a danger, some would say an inevitability that new terrorists will acquire, or develop and fabricate, and use WMDs - chemical, biological or nuclear.

Recent experience - for example, the use of nerve agents by the Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo and of anthrax in the United States - shows that biological and chemical weapons are unpredictable and difficult to use effectively, that is, to cause a large number of casualties. Effective dispersal of both biological and chemical weapons is very difficult, so these weapons may not well serve the purposes of the new terrorists.

To fulfil their aims, therefore, I believe that future new terrorists are more likely to make nuclear attacks; these are not only more likely to succeed, but their Armageddon nature is likely to appeal to fundamentalists. Nuclear terrorism may be the most likely future use of nuclear explosives, replacing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries (nuclear-weapon proliferation) as perhaps the most serious threat to national security. The success of recent attacks against American targets indicates that nuclear weapons do not deter terrorism by protecting countries armed with nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence has no role in dealing with the new terrorism.

Nuclear terrorist groups may become involved in several activities:

• Stealing or otherwise acquiring fissile material and fabricating and detonating a primitive nuclear explosive;

• Making and detonating a radiological weapon to spread radioactive material;

• Attacking a nuclear-power reactor to disseminate radioactivity;

• Attacking the high-level radioactive waste tanks at reprocessing plants to spread the radioactivity contained within;

• Attacking a plutonium store to spread the plutonium contained within;

• Stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon from the arsenal of a nuclear-weapon power and detonating it;

• Attacking, sabotaging or hijacking a transporter of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials.

All these actions have the potential to cause large numbers of deaths.

Of these possibilities, terrorists will probably prefer to set off a nuclear explosive, perhaps using a stolen nuclear weapon or, more likely, a nuclear explosive fabricated by them from acquired fissile material. Terrorists would be satisfied with a nuclear explosive device that is far less sophisticated than the types of nuclear weapons demanded by the military. What is the risk that terrorists will fabricate and use a primitive nuclear explosive?

A 100-tonne nuclear explosion would produce a crater about 30 metres across. The lethal area for prompt radiation after such an explosion (1.2 square kilometres) is larger than that for blast (0.4 square kilometre) or heat (0.1 square kilometre). Anyone in the open within 600 metres would probably be killed by these direct effects." For an explosion in Trafalgar Square, London the area would extend from Cambridge Circus to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Whitehall. Other deaths would be caused by buildings collapsing or debris falling and by fires from broken gas pipes or petrol in cars; the effects of fires could exceed those from the direct effects of heat. Many square kilometres (in this example, most of central London) would be contaminated by radioactive fallout.

Such an explosion would paralyse the emergency services. Many seriously injured would die from lack of care, from delays to ambulances and releasing those trapped in buildings. In the UK there are only a few hundred burns beds in the whole National Health Service. Panic could affect even trained emergency personnel, especially from awareness of radioactive fallout.

Thermal radiation from an explosion of this size would kill within one minute those outside or near windows up to 200 meters away. Blast would kill up to 800 meters away, prompt radiation up to one kilometre (in this example, all of Soho, the Royal National Theatre and Westminster Abbey). Heat injuries would extend to one kilometre and blast to two kilometres (including the Elephant and Castle, Euston and Victoria stations).

The nuclear electronic pulse would damage communications equipment out to two kilometers and electronic equipment to ten kilometres (Stratford, Streatham and Willesden). This would have severe consequences for fire and police services and hospitals.

Assuming a 24-kilometres/hour wind, fallout would cause acute radiation sickness to those exposed in the open in a cigar-shaped area ten kilometres long and up to two kilometres wide. The risk of cancer long-term would extend about 80 kilometres downwind (with the prevailing south-westerly wind, almost to Colchester). Plutonium would be widely dispersed; depending on how uniformly it was distributed, an even larger area could, according to international regulations, need to be evacuated and decontaminated.

In the short-term, vital measures against nuclear (and other) terrorism include efficient protection of key nuclear (and biological and chemical) materials and facilities, with effective intelligence on the activities of terrorist groups capable of such actions. So far as nuclear terrorism is concerned, special attention should be given to the control of plutonium. This protection must take into account the relatively small amounts of plutonium needed to make a nuclear explosive.

Society may decide that the terrorist risk of acquiring and using a nuclear explosive, and the awesome consequences of such use, are such that some nuclear activities should be given up. An obvious example is the reprocessing of spent nuclear-power reactor fuel to separate the plutonium from it and the use of this plutonium to produce Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel for nuclear reactors. The steps of chemically separating the plutonium oxide from uranium oxide in MOX, converting the oxide into plutonium metal and assembling the metal or plutonium oxide together with conventional explosive to produce a nuclear explosion are not technologically demanding and do not require materials from specialist suppliers. The information required to carry out these operations is freely available in the open literature.

None of the concepts involved in understanding how to separate the plutonium are difficult; a second-year undergraduate would be able to devise a suitable procedure by reading standard reference works, consulting the open literature in scientific journals and searching the Internet. A small number, three or so, of people with appropriate skills could separate the plutonium from MOX and design and fabricate a crude nuclear explosive. All the nuclear-physics data needed to design a crude nuclear explosive device are available in the open literature.

The storage and fabrication of MOX fuel assemblies, their transportation and storage at conventional nuclear-power stations on a scale currently envisaged by the nuclear industry will be extremely difficult to safeguard and protect. The risk of diversion or theft of MOX fuel by terrorist groups is an alarming possibility. The risk is thought by many to be great enough to justify the argument that the reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel and the production and use of MOX fuel should be stopped.

But in the long run, the best, and perhaps the only, way to defeat nuclear - and other - terrorism is to remove people's justified grievances and to improve their social welfare.

As Tom Milne comments, majority public opinion has always opposed this country becoming a non-nuclear-weapons state until all others do likewise. However, the Pugwash report (quoted by Pease) notes that the nuclear threat has not been a matter of public concern for several years and we wonder if their conclusion may be too pessimistic. Scrapping Trident would certainly be a nine-day wonder, but in today's political climate it surely need no longer make a political party unelectable. Rob Green has suggested elsewhere that the UK should announce the decommissioning of the Trident nuclear programme at the 2005 NPT review conference. He believes that doing so would transform the debate on nuclear disarmament - and perhaps earn the Prime Minister of the day a Nobel Peace Prize.

Of course, the nuclear powers also have individual reasons for wanting to maintain nuclear capability and there can be no certainty that others would follow our lead. Additionally, as many nuclear apologists have pointed out, knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons will always be with us. This implies an even more radical need - an end to war. The start of the second 50 years surely provides an opportunity to do better.

Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs

• Overview of the terrorist threat to international peace and security Professor Paul Wilkinson University of St Andrews

Ms. Anita Nilsson

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Mr. Mikhail Berdennikov

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)

Ambassador Tibor T6th

Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

• Terrorism and small arms and light weapons Dr. Rohan Gunaratna University of St Andrews

Mr. Vladimir P. Salov

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Moderator: Dr. Randy Rydell

Department for Disarmament Affairs

1.      To meet and talk about peace, when others can see only violence as the solution, is no wimpish activity.

2.      The support of outsiders is often critical in ensuring the physical and psychological survival of those who dare to do this work.

3.      Nearly one half of the interventions were carried out by people with some spiritual basis for their activities.

4.      A slow steady process of trust-building is often necessary before official negotiations can start, if they are to succeed.

5.      Business has a powerful role to play.

6.      Traditional processes can be of key importance in peace making.

7.      Women frequently offer the ingredients essential to the establishment of peace, particularly in addressing the feelings involved.

8.      For this work to be extended, far more evaluation needs to be done.

9.      The effectiveness of NGO work in this field has increased dramatically, but it should not become a replacement for government action.

10.  The interventions described above are extraordinarily cost-effective.

However, as weapons Proliferation continues it becomes even more important for us to work harder to find solutions. The following 20 positive steps to kick start the campaign:

1.      Make the message simple and short like 'Drop the Debt' Campaign. Choose a name for the campaign, a catchy one.

2.      Have a policy statement to explain the issue and Action plan. It will include:

(a) Maintaining an Arms Register that is patents, quantity, future productions and sale records. There is a UN and Arms Register started in 1993, but it only takes into accounts tanks, ships and air planes. Small Arms and Land mines are not included.

(b) A reduction of Arms per year agreement

(c) A verification procedure followed by rewards for compliance and penalties/sanctions for non-compliance.

(d) UN or similar international body to link savings in human and monetary resources to be linked to economic and social development.

(e) ARC is campaigning for the establishment of a secretariat for running this vital campaign. The secretariat will collect and allocate funds for development and peace building projects; it will work on establishment of sites for collection and dispersal of weapons. It will start alternative schemes for conversion and diversification of defence industry and find alternative jobs for people employed in the arms industry. It will also work on changing the political climate for the adoption of ARC proposals to be build in the programme of the key arms exporting countries to phase out production and export of arms and change it to peaceful purposes.

(f) The international community must adopt a global Arms Trade Treaty in time for the next UN arms conference in 2006

3.      Form a group or committee to start and maintain the campaign. Include other NGO's, Peace and humanitarian organisations.

4.      Make presentation about the campaign at other organisations and public events.

5.      Assist in challenging UK, EU (European Union) and policies of other states. On manufacturing, export licensing and illegal trafficking of Arms.

6.      Learn from the two most famous and successful campaigns i.e. Land mines and ICC (International Criminal court) There are at present 1900 NGO's working directly or indirectly for Land mines Campaigns in different parts of the world. This shows organisation skills, co-ordination and power of conveying your message to the public. Same is true of the ICC (International Criminal court) which; through diligence and hard work have resulted in the creation of International Criminal Court

7.      To start by monthly-newsletter, high -lighting work already done and future plans.

8.      To stop glorification of war and military heroes. Make positive peace actions known to the world and establish peace museums, universities and memorials for peace activists.

9.      Lobbying Parliament and government ministers, MP and MEP's to bring legislation for the reduction of Arms. Direct it at the government, arms manufacturers and civil society. Campaign for arms collection centre for destroying or burning the hardware. Make civil Society, police, and the state part of a joint effort.

10.  Campaign for protocol/convention on 'reduction of arms by set percentage' and link savings to poverty reduction. The convention will be a starting point to discuss and review the finer points of the issue.

11.  Networking with other similar organisations to raise the issue in the press and the media. We are publishing the Arms No More discussion booklet which is available on ARC website – www.arcuk.org

12.  Speaking to schools, universities, and other educational establishments in order to promote greater understanding, especially amongst young people of the issue.

13.  Work on creating Cultures of Peace to end culture of guns. UN has designated 2001-2010 as a decade of culture of Peace and Non-Violence. All our efforts should be driven to fulfill what the UN defines a culture of peace as:

"all the values, attitudes and forms of behaviour that reflect respect for life, for human dignity and for all human rights, the rejection of violence in all its forms, and commitment to the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity, tolerance and understanding between people".

14.  We should embrace the "proportional and integrated approach to disarmament and development", which recognises that the security of the individual and freedom from fear, must be crucial guarantees in the development process.

15.  The International Community must engage states and civil society to implement sustainable, people-centred development policies in post-conflict environments to consolidate disarmament and demilitarization programmes.

16.  The world states should review existing legislation on civilian possession of firearms, following progressive models such as those of the UK, Australia and New Zealand.

17.  The world states should raise the level of professional behaviour of the military, police and custom officials, by ensuring that human rights training programmes are an equal part of initiatives to increase the capacity of the security sector.

18.  The world states should support programmes aimed at improving the registration and recording of firearms in civilian possession.

19.  Start a clean investment campaign by which business, government and local authorities do not invest in weapon manufacturing companies.

20.  Start a conversion of arms strategy by which arm factories can be converted for building ships of peace, windmills for sustainable energy creation, rail cars for public transportation and the like. Studies for economic conversion have long shown that the most effective way to create lots of good jobs is to invest in those things that are socially and environmentally beneficial.

VIJAY MEHTA MA


 CO- Chair World Disarmament Campaign                                                     TEL:             (+44) 207 377 2111
 Vice Chairman Arms Reduction Coalition                                                      MOBILE:     07776 231 018  
 Vice Chairman: Action for United Nations Renewal                                      FAX:            (+44) 207 377 2999    
 Secretary: London CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament)                   EMAIL:        vijay@anglo-sphere.com 
 Editor: INLAP TIME (Institute for Law & Peace)
 Founder Member: Non Violent Action Monthly Magazine

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