for PrepCom Review Conference

Email: vijay@anglo-sphere.com

The spread of nuclear technology and knowledge is out of the tube and we won't be able to put it back. The proliferation is on the rise and nuclear secrets and kits have been sold over the counter by the Pakistani rogue scientist Abdul Qadeer Kahn since the 1970's. We are not sure that besides Korea, Libya and Iran who else has the technology to blow us all out of extinction. The present development of new nuclear weapons, missile defences and plans to weaponise outer space by US is adding to the spread of nuclear proliferation.

Mohamed El Baradei Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency wrote in a article in New York Times that: "Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive they to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability — and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programmes. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons."

Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the non proliferation regime.

The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, for lesson the risk of nuclear non proliferation. The current system relies on a gentleman's agreement that is not only non binding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise. .

We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls — while preserving the rights of all states to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.

In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended — and rightly so in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of Non Proliferation Treaty obligation requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 per cent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. It should be in force far all countries. In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months' notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.

This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council. The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste — would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users. Towards this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.

Of course, a fundamental part of the non proliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear states recognized under the Non Proliferation Treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States—to move towards disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the Non Proliferation Treaty review conference next year. We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of long-standing conflict like West Asia, South Asia and the 'Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their .capacities and postulate plans for their use. Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place."

"The initiatives set forth last week were all timely and useful and deserve international support. But they do not go far enough."President George Bush called for tighter export controls by the leading nuclear supplier nations, strengthened intelligence and law enforcement against rogue proliferators, and expanded efforts to eliminate or secure nuclear bomb fuel left over from abandoned weapons programmes. What he failed to do was put America's weight behind a sustained effort to revise and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT ) and persuade the handful of countries (India, Pakistan,Israel and North Korea outside the treaty to join. Also disappointing was his failure to propose increased American financing for the expanded bomb fuel elimination programme

"Mr Bush refuses to recognise that established nuclear powers like the United States undermine anti-proliferation efforts when they talk about developing new nuclear weapons for possible use against non-nuclear states."

"Mr Bush's... speech to the National Defense University ... left some key questions unanswered...

"One of Mr Bush's proposals is to expand the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1991 — meant to pay for the dismantling of nuclear weapons and the employment of weapons scientists in the dissolved Soviet Union — to other countries, such as Libya... Mr Bush, however, cut the funding for the current Nunn-Lugar programme in the budget he submitted to Congress ...Cooperation to halt nuclear proliferation means that all states have to devalue nuclear weapons. So Mr Bush should terminate his $3bn [£1.6bn] programme to develop small bunker-busting nuclear weapons."

"The appalling example of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist who masterminded Pakistan's bomb and then, with despicable greed, sold the secrets to other rogue regimes, underlines the dangers of perverted technicians willing to merchandise mass destruction..."International efforts and treaties to stop the spread of such weapons are failing, and the world must join forces to criminalise nuclear trafficking and plug the loopholes in the enforcement system. The proposals... go to the heart of the matter. There is no justification for anyone to sell equipment to a country seeking to enrich or reprocess nuclear fuel for the first time. Iran has shown that civilian nuclear programmes can easily mask a determination to make weapons... Mr Bush has moved more swiftly and more deftly on the proliferation threat than his critics will admit."

"Mr Bush's decision some years ago not to sign the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, as well as his recent decision to develop a new class of battlefield nuclear weapons, will not augment US credibility on proliferation issues. Washington cannot \vith its left hand interdict proliferation networks like Dr Khan's, and, with its right, refurbish and expand its own nuclear arsenal... The feasibility of Mr Bush's plan depends crucially on international cooperation, which he is not 1 going to get unless he pursues a multilateral foreign policy."

"The failure of the nuclear weapons states to live up to their part of the NPT fatally undermines the entire non-proliferation regime. As long as they cling to their arsenals — and continue to update and modernise them — they reinforce the notion that such weapons have utility and are worth pursuing. Moreover, their inaction confirms the belief that the NPT is a hypocritical agreement that perpetuates nuclear apartheid. That mentality erodes the legitimacy of the NPT and under scores Japan's commitment to nuclear disarmament."

"Iran has neither stopped developing a bomb nor lying about its nuclear programme ... Last week, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] announced that it has discovered plans for a P2 uranium enrichment facility ... Part of the problem here is a loophole in the non-proliferation regime that Iran is playing to the hilt. That regime does not prohibit members from enriching uranium... Mr Bush proposed closing precisely this loophole... This standard should be employed in the case of Iran immediately, outside of any timetable for renegotiating the non-proliferation regime as a whole."

"Mr Bush... has learnt from the past year. A year ago his officials were busy disparaging the IAEA for the failure of its inspectors to find a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. Now that the US acknowledges there was no such failure because there was no such programme, Mr Bush has chosen to bolster the IAEA ... "But the civil nuclear industry will have to subsume its own interests to the greater good. However much the world needs nuclear power, especially as a carbon-free source of energy to help stem climate change, it has an even more immediate interest in stemming the spread of atomic bombs. And Mr Bush's proposals make a useful contribution to that goal."

From Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat FRS (President Emeritus of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs), and Professor Robert A. Hinde FRS (Chairman of the British Pugwash Group, The Times 13^th of February 2004

Sir, Your call for the world to "act to halt nuclear proliferation" (leading article, February 13) is timely and urgent.

You rightly praise the proposals from President George W. Bush to curb the acquisition of nuclear materials by some countries, but you do not comment on the fundamental aspect of the problem.

Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), hit the nail on the head when he pointed out that the onus is on the established nuclear powers to lead the way in nuclear disarmament You described this as unhelpful, but it is the case. As long as some states, including the most powerful one, believe that their security demands the possession of nuclear weapons, how can we deny such security to other states which consider themselves to be vulnerable?

Again you rightly say that "the yardstick by which a country will be judged will be not only democracy and human rights, but adherence to nuclear pledges and protocols". The relevant treaty is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which all five nuclear powers, ie, the US, Russia, France, China and the UK, have signed and ratified. In mentioning the NPT in his speech, President Bush appears to note one aspect of it: to

prevent new countries from acquiring nuclear weapons; however, under Article VI of the NPT, the existing nuclear powers committed themselves to proceed, in good faith, to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This commitment was reaffirmed "unequivocally" at the NPT Review Conference in 2000.

The elimination of nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a safeguard regime to prevent the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons, present extremely difficult problems, but they will never be solved unless an effort is made to tackle them. The body set up to do this, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, is prevented from doing its job by the continued refusal by the nuclear powers to put it on its agenda.

Unless this issue is given high priority it is inevitable that other nations will seek security in keeping or acquiring nuclear weapons and eventually terrorist groups too will acquire nuclear weapons.

pugwash@mac.com

UN NUCLEAR WATCHDOG CALLS FOR TOUGHER NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME

The head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency today called for the urgent strengthening of the world's non-proliferation regime to ensure that nuclear materials and even weapons are not acquired by terrorists.

Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), <"http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2004/medadvise200402.html">said the existing rules and safeguards are not tough enough to deal with modern realities and the world risks "self-destruction" unless it updates them.

Speaking at the IAEA's headquarters in Vienna, Mr. ElBaradei said he welcomed proposals unveiled yesterday by President George W. Bush of the United States to introduce such measures as tighter controls over the export of nuclear materials and protocols allowing broader inspection rights.

"I have the same concern and sense of urgency expressed by President Bush to shore up the non-proliferation regime and international security system," he said.

Urging the international community to get together to quickly lay out appropriate reforms, Mr. ElBaradei said the IAEA needs more authority to conduct inspections, nuclear exports must be controlled more strictly and there must be accelerated moves towards nuclear disarmament.

Mr. ElBaradei elaborated on his proposals for improving and strengthening the non-proliferation regime in an opinion article published in The New York Times today.

"If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction," he warned in the article.

Mr. ElBaradei said there is currently not enough of a penalty for countries that withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. He suggested an automatic review of the country's move by the UN Security Council as a minimum.

Mr. ElBaradei also suggested that the five States recognized under the treaty as nuclear powers - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the US - must make verifiable and irreversible moves towards disarmament. This would include bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news

US Poll Finds Support for Arms Control

By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 17, 2004; Page A16

Americans continue to fear weapons of mass destruction and believe the Bush administration should work more closely with U.S. allies to stop their spread, according to a nationwide opinion poll released this week in Washington.

International cooperation and arms-control agreements are likely to be more effective than U.S. military threats against countries that try to develop nuclear weapons, respondents said.

"They really understand how hard it is to address proliferation. The United States by itself, even with all its military power, can't target the problem. You have to have cooperation between states," said Steven Kull of the Program on International Policy Attitudes.

The results came in a poll that touched on a panoply of unconventional weapons. Conducted in March, it followed by one month a call by President Bush for measures to curb development of nuclear weapons and halt the illicit global trade in nuclear materials.

Although the White House called for more stringent international efforts, including tougher inspections and a global interdiction program, the Bush administration has made high-profile departures from treaties -- and from peaceful solutions, most notably in Iraq.

When asked about Pakistan, where weapons scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan recently admitted peddling nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran, 73 percent of respondents said the most important lesson is that the United States should give international agencies "more power to conduct intrusive inspections."

Reflecting worries about atomic dangers, 86 percent of respondents to the poll -- conducted by PIPA/Knowledge Networks -- said the United States should work with other nuclear powers toward eliminating nuclear weapons. A similar percentage said the administration should join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, signed but not ratified.

A majority questioned the effectiveness of a test ban, given that crude nuclear weapons can be built without testing. Yet only 18 percent supported the idea of periodic explosions to make certain U.S. weapons work.

Seventy-seven percent countered that the United States has other testing methods "and, anyway, the U.S. has so many nuclear weapons, America's enemies have to assume that an overwhelming number will work."

As the Bush administration studies low-yield nuclear weapons for potential use against underground targets, such as terrorist caves, two-thirds said production of such weapons would set a bad example.

A treaty banning all weapons in space was considered a good idea by 74 percent of respondents, and only 21 percent favored building a missile defense system right away. Sixty-eight percent said more research should be done first.

The Bush administration has said it is committed to deploying an antimissile system.

Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
PO Box 652
Brunswick, ME 04011
(207) 729-0517
(207) 319-2017 (Cell phone)
http://www.space4peace.org
globalnet@mindspring.com

During its nearly 60 years of existence UN through its work comprising more then two dozen organizations has some remarkable successes to its credit in peacekeeping operations. It has helped people rebuild countries from ruins of war. UN has maintained peace and order in such diverse places as Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Cyprus and Kashmir, over 30 years in difficult circumstances.

General and complete disarmament — or gradual elimination of weapons of mass destruction — is one of the goals set by the United Nations. Its immediate objectives are to eliminate the danger of war, particularly nuclear war, and to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race.

The UN Disarmament machinery works in New York and Geneva through General Assembly First Committee, Disarmament commission, conference on Disarmament and Department for Disarmament all playing pivotal role in preparatory committee and review conferences of NPT. IAEA supervises peaceful uses of nuclear energy and controls spread of nuclear proliferation.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction is the branch of Department for Disarmament Affairs and provides substantive support for the activities of the United Nations in the area of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), including the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction in terrorist acts, as well as missiles. The Branch follows closely all developments and trends with regard to weapons of mass destruction in all their aspects in order to keep the Secretary-General fully informed and to provide information to Member States and the international community. The Branch supports, and participates in, multilateral efforts to strengthen the international norm on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, in this connection, it cooperates with relevant intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom).

The main players in the Arms control and Disarmament issues are Intergovernmental Organisations, the Diplomatic Disarmament community and Governmental Ministries. These work along NGO's and Civil society. There is intense activity of different types that is conferences, fringe meetings and research projects, along with the daily meetings of the Disarmament committee. They all trying to influence the outcome of the NPT.

On the subject of research, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) deserves a special mention. The Institutes activities transcend diverse perspectives: from global diplomacy to regional and local dimensions, and from the human focus to the international outlook. This breadth of scope has led the group to branch out its activities into three areas: global security and disarmament, regional security and disarmament and human security and disarmament. Global security and disarmament covers international arms control agreements and their implementation as well as questions on international security, missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Regional security and disarmament develops themes linked to conflict concentrated in specific areas of the globe, such as promoting civil society participation in West African disarmament dialogues. Finally, human security and disarmament explores the complex interrelations between disarmament, human rights and development. Anti-personnel mines, small arms and peace-building issues feature prominently in this area.

However the recent exposure of proliferation in Pakistan, Lybia and Iran is a challenge for United Nations and the International Community who need to see that non nuclear states do not acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction by having access to enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. A complete transparency and accountability need to be maintained in the present frightening political climate for the progress in non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass Destruction can take place which will minimise the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.

We need to examine the role of members states of United Nations to see why after agreeing to the Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) they are not abiding by it. The Nuclear Weapon States regard disarmament as a non-issue and they feel no obligation to go forward in implementing the legally binding goals of NPT. Its a case of more promises and no intention to honour them.

NPT is still the corner stone and the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of general and total disarmament by nuclear-weapons states. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. 188 states have joined the NPT, including the five Nuclear-Weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms disarmament agreement. The NPT is essentially a nuclear disarmament treaty. Its central pillar, Article VI, obliges its signatories "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". The International Court of Justice has stated unequivocally that the achievement of global nuclear disarmament is a legal obligation on all states.

Every five years the NPT states meet for a Review Conference. The next one will take place in May 2005. In the intervening years there are Preparatory Committee Meetings (PrepComs). The next PrepCom will be in Spring 2004.

(Initiatives, events, campaigns and actions)

There are 100's of initiatives around the world to ban nuclear weapons and for the successful implementation of NPT. Here are a few of them

a) This is the first in a series of regular updates from Reaching Critical Will on the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in New York on April 26- May 7, 2004.
In this NPT News Advisory:

1. Invitation to the 2004 NPT PrepCom

2. NGO Registration

3. What can we hope to achieve?

4. NGO Statements to the delegates

5. Housing Options for NGO representatives

6. News in Review: the daily NGO newsletter

7.What can I do if I can't go to New York?

8. Women's Caucus at the NPT

9. Links for more information

Reaching Critical Will has recently updated and re-organized NPT page at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/nptindex1.html, which contains all official documents from past NPT meetings, background on the treaty and the issues at stake in 2004, NGO analysis, reports, and presentations to the PrepCom and more.

This news advisory includes brief updates on various international disarmament machinery, including:

1) The United Nations Disarmament Commission Postpones 2004 Session

2) NGOs and the Security Council Draft Resolution on Non-Proliferation

3) New Conference on Disarmament resource from Reaching Critical Will 

4) "Contextualizing the NPT," a Report for Non-Nuclear Weapon States Party to the NPT

5) NGO Morning Strategy Sessions at the NPT Rescheduled

As always, we welcome your comments, questions, or concerns.  This and all other news advisories are archived on our site.

On Monday, April 5, the United Nations Disarmament Commission convened in New York, as scheduled.  Yet despite months of diplomatic wrangling over the substantive agenda items, the major players- the US, the UK, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)- remain deadlocked and the session is now postponed. 

In his opening statement as Chair, Georgia's Ambassador Revaz Adamia urged Members to "seek inspiration" from past achievements of the Commission, such as Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and conventional arms control measures.  He stressed the need for revitalized efforts in the face of new challenges to the international disarmament regime, including "new concepts of deadly weaponry," threats of terrorism, and "the readiness or willingness of some Member States to comply" with existing obligations. 

Under-Secretary-General Nobuyasu Abe, too, delivered a short intervention, in which he reminded States that "the work of this Commission has been shaped by the political will of its members" and called for "increased joint efforts to strengthen the multilateral system of international peace and security." 

Ms. Philomena Murnaghan, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ireland, was elected Vice-Chair of the Commission. 

The First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD I), provided the mandate for the United Nations Disarmament Commission as the world's only universal forum for deliberating substantive disarmament issues.  Years later, it was decided that the UNDC would focus only on a few substantive issues over a three year cycle, in order to facilitate in-depth discussions on these matters most important to international peace and security.  The Commission is then to make consensus-based recommendations to the General Assembly. 

In 2000, the Commission adopted an agenda that covered 1) Nuclear disarmament; and 2) Confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).  Completely divided on the issues, Member States chose to postpone the 2002 session, in order to provide more time for reaching consensus.  By the close of the third and final year of this cycle, the UNDC adjourned in 2003 without having reached consensus. 

For the 2004 session, the NAM States wished to continue deliberations on the two previous items.  The United States, which drafted a 2003 GA resolution (58/126) on the issue of First Committee reform, wished for the Commission to deliberate the non-substantive issue of UNDC reform.  Finally, the United Kingdom, a bit less adamantly, proposed an agenda that would cover nuclear verification and best practices in SALW. 

Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the NAM, stated that they "remain hopeful" that continued deliberations will result in the agreement on agenda items that take into consideration the concerns of all delegations.  Both the UK and the US refrained from making an official statement to the Commission. 

The informal consultations on the agenda continued immediately after the Chair suspended the session on Monday and will continue throughout the three few weeks. 

After months of intensive debate amongst the P5, a new draft resolution on nonproliferation was made public on March 24.  The draft resolution, as it currently stands, fails to acknowledge the indivisible relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament. If this resolution is passed as is, it would further contribute to the dangerous de-linkage between these two, incontrovertibly interdependent goals.

NGOs based in New York sent a memorandum, along with recommendations for draft language on the resolution, to the Security Council and other states, emphasizing the need for full consultation with all interested states, and with civil society, including through an open session and an informal ("Arria formula") civil society briefing.

Abolition 2000, a network of over 2000 disarmament NGOs, is conducting a major grassroots mobilization, urging civil society to contact the Security Council and their Ministries of Foreign Affairs to demand an open session of the Security Council as they debate this unprecedented SC resolution.

Click here to read the letter of appeal that was sent out by the Abolition Global Council, the International Steering Committee of Abolition 2000.

Click here to read the article from the UN Wire.

Click here to read the statements delivered by John Burroughs and Susi Snyder at the UN Correspondents Association Press Club Press Briefing on March 31, 2004.

For more information, contact either Susi Snyder, WILPF UN Director, or John Burroughs, Executive Director of Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy.

Now that the Conference on Disarmament has adjourned its first session of 2004, we have compiled a Summary of Statements by Topic, that is now available on our website. 

This resource makes it easy for CD watchers to see where each State stands on the pertinent issue facing the Geneva body.  We have listed every reference by Member States made to the following topics:

Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
Subsidiary Body on Nuclear Disarmament
Negative Security Assurances
A5 Agenda
Verification
Terrorism

This list will be updated at the close of each session.  We hope this will prove to be a useful resource.

While the CD takes a break, be sure to stay updated with other disarmament fora by subscribing to RCW's other email news services, including the News in Review, the daily newsletter published during the NPT.  Subscribe today by sending an email to: nir@reachingcriticalwill.org.  To receive the weekly reports on the CD, send an email to: cd@reachingcriticalwill.org, or check out the archived updates.  For a full description of all of RCW's email services, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/action/listindex.html.

In collaboration with the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy and the Western States' Legal Foundation, Reaching Critical Will has published a report, "Contextualizing the NPT," in preparation for the NPT PrepCom, April 26- May 7.  The report, which outlines various challenges facing the treaty and recommends ways of moving forward on key issues, is available in PDF and with an accompanying PowerPoint presentation.  Both are available on the web for a limited time. 

Throughout the PrepCom, the Abolition 2000 network will be holding a daily Strategy Session for NGOs at 8 AM, in the Grumman Room 10th floor, of the UNCC at 777 UN Plaza.  Following each day's strategy session, we will be reconvening at 9 AM in Conference Room A for a briefing by delegates at the PrepCom. 

For more information on these strategy sessions, contact Emma McGregor-Mento, the Abolition 2000 coordinator. 

For a full listing of all of the events planned for this year's PrepCom, see the Events Calendar, also available in a printable format. 

************************************************
Rhianna Tyson
Project Associate
Reaching Critical Will
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, UN Office
777 UN Plaza
6th Floor
New York, NY 10017
phone: (212) 682-1265
fax: (212) 286-8211
rhianna@reachingcriticalwill.org
www.reachingcriticalwill.org
www.wilpfint.ch

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To identify areas for future action by all players

Theme
Our aim is to link the issue of compliance by both Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The future of the Treaty is under threat from proliferation in at least three regions, while at the same time its most powerful state parties are conducting a form of unilateral policing -- by threatening 'pre-emptive' strikes against the proliferators while developing a new generation of nuclear weaponry themselves. The topic offers an opportunity to explore in more depth the type of proposals that were made during the first two 'In Defence of the NPT' workshops, organised by the Committee earlier this year. These proposals also include efforts to tackle the impasse in the CD.
IPB Website: www.ipb.org

it is an a emergency campaign to ban nuclear weapons by 2020

Mayors for Peace: http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/mayors/

In order to explore the general publics awareness and understanding of the nuclear weapons issue, the Nuclear Weapons Awareness Project worked through Topline to carry out public opinion research in April 2003 during the period of the Iraq War.

The results of focus group discussions, along with research into previous surveys on the issue of public opinion and nuclear weapons provided the following important information:

• The overall awareness and knowledge of basic nuclear weapons issues was higher among men who were in general opposed to disarmament, whereas women and younger people were less informed and less defined in their opinions, but more receptive to arguments for nuclear disarmament.

• Nuclear weapons were primarily perceived to be bombs that caused huge destruction. None had heard of the term mini-nukes but understood them to mean smaller weapons that were less destructive and had an effect on a smaller area. Initially, this made some feel reassured that they were less awful than current nuclear weapons but on reflection they felt that they were worse because it would be easier for countries to justify using them.

• There was a general perception that the threat of nuclear war had receded after the end of the Cold War. Anti-nuclear weapons campaigns were felt to also have receded into the background.

• There was a perception that the world had changed after September 11, and that the threat (nuclear or otherwise) from terrorists and rogue states was now much greater.

• There was a strong perception that there was a new threat in the world after Sept 11, now reinforced by the conflict in Iraq. Although nuclear weapons were mentioned as part of the Iraq conflict (blurred with chemical/biological weapons) these were not felt to be a direct threat to the UK. However, there were concerns that it might become so. This new threat was perceived to be a considerable change from the days of the Cold War with Russia and America in deadlock. Respondents over 30, especially over 50, were highly aware of this change.

• There was a feeling that the general publics voice was not listened to. For example the marches against the war that some of the respondents supported had made no impact on the decision to go to war with Iraq.

• Respondents perceived a breakdown in unity of international collaborative institutions such as the UN and EU and a lack of power and influence against the autonomous actions of a maverick USA which had initiated the Iraq conflict against the wishes of the world. The general view was that America would do what it wanted, the UK would follow and the rest of the world would be powerless to change this. There was felt to be a lack of trust and hope in the world at the moment to make changes for the better in areas such as nuclear disarmament.

• People were surprised at the small number of states that did possess nuclear weapons, and were not very aware of the major treaties (NPT, CTBT, ABM) to control proliferation. A small minority of respondents were able to cite the full list of nuclear countries. The majority were able to cite: Russia, America, the UK, France and possibly China as these were perceived to be major powers. Others mentioned were North Korea, Pakistan and India. Iraq was also mentioned in the context of the current crisis. When prompted with a list of nuclear weapon states respondents were surprised by the presence of Israel and also the high numbers of nuclear weapons held. This was felt to be very high in comparison to the amount of damage just one bomb could do.

• There was very limited awareness of the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However,there was recollection that the US and Russia had agreed to some disarmament but no-one knew if this had actually happened.

• The majority saw a future with more nuclear weapons not less - with new and more dangerous countries obtaining them. This was felt to be in order to be on a par with the superpowers and to threaten them.

• On prompting with a list of countries who had decided not to follow their nuclear programmes or had dismantled them. The response among many was positive and offered hope but the more skeptical men stated that these countries were not major world players.

• On discussing whether global nuclear disarmament was possible, most felt the following elements had to be in place:

• There was a willingness to consider a nuclear weapons-free Europe but unilateral nuclear disarmament by the UK was for the most part dismissed as an unfeasible option.

• The major barrier to people's support of nuclear disarmament was the climate of fear and instability with the ever present threat of rogue states (including the US) and terrorists, and the loose technology floating around.

• The major driver towards a nuclear weapons-free world was the idea of it as an epic challenge for the human race in the 21st century to prevent our species from self destruction.

• Public opinion on specific issues relating to reducing the threat of nuclear weapons was much more positive and malleable than on the issue of overall nuclear disarmament.

Abolition 2000, a network of over 2000 disarmament NGOs, is conducting a major grassroots mobilization, urging civil society to contact the Security Council and their Ministries of Foreign Affairs to demand an open session of the Security Council as they debate this unprecedented SC resolution. It is a coalition of European NGO's committed to global Abolition of nuclear weapons. It aims to educate and enlist the help of members of European Parliament (MEP's) to consider what could be done on a European level to further full implementation of NPT and Europe's participation in review conference of NPT of 2005.

Abolition 2000 Network – http://www.abolition2000.org/, www.gn.apc.2000uk

CND website: www.cnduk.org

From June 23 to 27,2004, Forum Barcelona 2004, the Peace Foundation and the International Peace Bureau host the Dialogue "Towards a World Without Violence", a space at the service of individuals, groups and movements working for peace around the world.

The gathering aims to be the largest international congress organized by the peace movement since the Hague Conference of 1999. Don't let it pass you by!

Violence, in the many forms that it takes, is all too present in our world. It generates suffering now and leads inevitably to more violence in the future.

Building a world free of violence is a formidable challenge and must be a top priority for governments, social movements and individuals. This Dialogue seeks to draw together ideas and generate proposals that will make such a world possible.

A range of formats-including meetings, round tables, seminars, cultural events, interviews and dialogue-will be used to take a closer look at the following issues:

1. The prevention and non-violent resolution of armed conflicts

Moving from an analysis of the causes and contexts of conflict to an exploration of nonviolent approaches to control and transformation. The experience of those pursuing peace in violent contexts will play a central role in this process.

2. The economy and preparation for war

Wars don't just happen: there are a series of factors that facilitate military conflict (including the arms trade and the influence of the military industry). The advocates of peace must be aware of these factors and know how to respond to them.

Light arms, weapons of mass destruction, antipersonnel mines... All perpetuate the same insecurity. An ambitious agenda needs to be developed to monitor, reduce and eliminate these threats.

All institutions involved in generating values (including schools, non formal education and the media) have a crucial role to play in overcoming the culture of violence and establishing a peace culture

Which concept of security and as defined by which set of priorities? How do such choices contribute to shaping our world? Moving from military defense towards human security.

International Peace Bureau (IPB): www.ipb.org

Fundacio per la Pau: www.fundacioperlapau.org

World Court Project: www.gn.apc.org/wcp

CCND: Http://ccnd.gn.apc.org/

UNA: www.una-uk.org

c) Writing a press release – Press Briefing 2

CND Website: http://www.cnduk.org

Movement of Abolition of War website: http://www.abolishwar.freeuk.com

100. International Peace Bureau website: http://www.ipb.org

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Mr President, it gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the presidency, to respond to the question that has been asked.

The European Union is committed to the multilateral treaty system, which provides the legal and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts. On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted an EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy incorporates and bases itself on the texts adopted by the European Council at Thessaloniki in June 2003.

The WMD strategy underlines the EU™s particular commitment to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NPT. The EU believes that all our efforts should be aimed at preserving and strengthening this fundamental instrument of international peace and security. The EU supports wholeheartedly the objectives laid down in the Treaty and is committed to the effective implementation of the final document of the 2000 NPT review conference and the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The EU has repeatedly stated that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Treaty. The EU statement to last year™s second preparatory committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT, recalled that Member States continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of, and universal compliance with, the NPT. In this regard we welcome the accession to the Treaty by Cuba, in 2002, and by Timor Leste in 2003, which brings it closer to universality. However, there are three countries - India, Israel and Pakistan - that remain outside the regime and we continue to call upon them to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

On 17 November 2003 the Council adopted a common position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Article 4 of the common position confirms that achieving universal adherence to the NPT is of crucial importance. To this end, the European Union will firstly call on those States not yet parties to the NPT to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non- nuclear-weapon states and to place all their nuclear facilities and activities under the provisions of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System.

Secondly, it will urge those states not yet having entered into safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfil their obligations in accordance with Article III of the NPT and to conclude such agreements as a matter of urgency.

Thirdly, it will promote all the objectives laid down in the NPT.

Fourthly, it will support the final document of the 2000 NPT review conference and the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

Fifthly, it will promote further consideration of security assurances.

Finally, it will promote measures to ensure that any possible misuse of civilian nuclear programmes for military purposes will be effectively excluded.

There is no common Council analysis of the progress on the implementation of the 13 steps. The European Union is however committed to encouraging the progress made towards systematic and progressive efforts towards disarmament.

The European Union will continue to encourage all efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT, as well as paragraphs 3 and 4c of the 1995 Declaration on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and the practical steps agreed in the 2000 final document.

The EU™s commitment to the comprehensive test ban treaty is also clear and was reiterated most recently by the EU common position on the universalisation of multilateral instruments adopted in November 2003. The EU will continue to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT. Pending its entry into force, we urge all states with nuclear capacity to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and refrain from any actions which are contrary to the CTBT.

The EU has acknowledged the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely achieved among the member states of the regions concerned. They enhance global and regional peace and security. We welcome and support both signature and ratification by the nuclear weapon states of the relevant protocols of nuclear- weapon-free zones.

On the question of verification and safeguards, the EU believes that the safeguards serve as a technical tool in support of the political goal of sustaining an environment in which there can be peaceful use of nuclear energy without the threat of proliferation. In this connection we strongly support the verification role of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Union also takes the view that adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguard agreements, and additional protocols to them, is a prerequisite in the effective and credible safeguards system.

The EU also continues to attach great importance to the fight against terrorism and strongly supports all measures that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The WMD strategy emphasises the EU™s commitment to strengthening export control policies and practices within its borders and beyond, in coordination with partners. The EU will work towards improving the existing export control mechanisms. It will advocate adherence to effective export control criteria by countries outside the existing regime and arrangements including in the nuclear field.

As regards the proliferation security initiative, the Council has not adopted a position on this issue. Not all Member States participate in the PSI. The question of the International Mayors™ Campaign has not been considered by the Council.

The third preparatory committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which will be held from 26 April to 7 May 2004, will be a pivotal event in terms of disarmament and non-proliferation in 2004. As presidency, we will work within the Union and with key partners, to seek agreement on a solid basis for the successful outcome of the review cycle. This work will take place in the first instance within the Working Group on Non-Proliferation and in its troika meetings with third countries. The work will include the preparation of EU common statements on various aspects of the Treaty for delivery by the presidency at the preparatory committee. The presidency will inform the European Parliament on the progress achieved in this field in accordance with Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union.

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I welcome the opportunity to contribute to this debate today although, inevitably, I will traverse some of the ground that has been so ably covered by the presidency.

Recent revelations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea have highlighted the importance of maintaining and strengthening effective controls. It is a matter of historic record that the clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in the 1990s and the consequent impact on regional stability gave rise to grave concern. North Korea™s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons last year was a further dangerous and destabilising step, both for the immediate region and the international community as a whole.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - NPT - which entered into force in 1970, established the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as we know it. This regime established the basic norms for behaviour. It provides - as the House will know - a legal ban on nuclear proliferation beyond the five nuclear weapons states recognised by the Treaty and makes nuclear proliferation activity illegal in the international community. With it came the principle of regulated nuclear trade, the concept of nuclear safeguards and, of course, the International Atomic Energy Authority, whose excellent work underpins the regime.

Understandably, much of the focus has been on the regime™s failures, but we often underestimate the success. In a 1960 presidential debate, John F. Kennedy envisaged a world with perhaps 20 nations with a nuclear capability. That his vision was never realised has been due, in large part, to the creation of the NPT. South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan andSouth Korea, for example, have all turned their backs on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, partly because of international pressure, but also as a result of sensible and wise decisions taken in response to domestic debate and opinion.

We also have positive recent developments with Iran, which has now accepted the Additional Protocol, and Libya. Against this background, while recognising the challenges that the NPT faces, particularly on nuclear proliferation and disarmament, we believe the forthcoming third preparatory committee can be approached with some confidence. There may well be shortcomings in the non-proliferation regime but they are certainly not terminal and they can, in our judgment, be addressed. We must continue to pursue the universal adoption of the NPT by countries that have so far refused to do so, and in particular India, Pakistan and Israel. North Korea must return to conformity with the Treaty. We must also extend the ratification of the important Additional Protocol to the Treaty. This Protocol provides the IAEA with enhanced and tougher powers to perform inspections. In this context, the Commission's role is first in assisting the presidency, which sees progress in this area as a high priority, and second in encouraging the maximum degree of EU coordination.

The last 12 months have seen the EU take enormous strides in strengthening its approach to non-proliferation. The European security strategy that was adopted at the December 2003 European Council identifies weapons of mass destruction as one of the most dangerous threats to today™s Europe. At the same European Council, the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was approved. This strategy is now being followed up by concrete action.

Work on implementation of the strategy is proceeding in a large number of areas which too numerous to set out today, but I will highlight a number of important examples.

The first was last November™s adoption by the General Affairs and External Relations Council of a text aimed at mainstreaming non-proliferation policies into the European Union™s wider relations with third countries, among other things, by introducing a non-proliferation clause in agreements with them. This new commitment on non-proliferation is important, because the new EU strategy aims to include provisions on non-proliferation in all agreements with third countries. This is now part of ongoing negotiations, for example with Syria, placing non-proliferation on a similar level to human rights and the fight against terrorism.

The EU Joint Action for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Russia was established by the Council in 1999 to enhance cooperation with the Russian Federation in the latter™s pursuit of a safe, secure and environmentally sound dismantlement, destruction or conversion of those WMD infrastructures, equipment and materials. The projects support chemical destruction and the disposal of weapons-grade plutonium. These projects, which are implemented by the Commission in close cooperation with a number of Member States, are a small but important part of the Community™s EUR 1 billion contribution to the G-8 Global Partnership, launched at the meeting in 2002 in Canada.

The Interparliamentary Conference hosted by the Commission under the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Cooperation Initiative on 20 and 21 November 2003, which took place here in Strasbourg, highlighted the considerable future challenges ahead if we are to safely dispose of the dangerous remains of Cold War WMD programmes. The conference™s significance was confirmed through its status as an interparliamentary gathering of figures from key national parliaments,including the United States Congress and the Russian Duma. For the WMD threat to be removed it must become and remain a high priority issue for national governments, regional organisations and the international community as a whole.

From a Community perspective, we are grateful for the increased attention given by the European Parliament to the need to adequately fund threat-reduction activities in the next budget cycle. The Commission, in cooperation with the European Parliament, is seeking to define future non-proliferation priorities and, thanks to a recent decision by Parliament, will be able shortly to launch a pilot project to further this work.

I am grateful for the opportunity to have taken part in this short but important debate on a matter of such international significance.

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'The US is moving away from city obliterators, to bunker busters or mini-nukes'

IN THE FIRST OF A TWO-PART SERIES ON NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA BHARAT KARNAD EXAMINES THE U.S. STRATEGY OF

PEACEFULLY INDIA AND PAKISTAN.HE SAYS; PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONSARE ALREADY UNDER U.S. CONTROL, AND NOW IT IS INDIA'S TURN

India-Pakistan talks on nuclear confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) are to begin on May 25. To understand what is at stake and what can reason-dy be agreed upon by the two counties, there is first the need to be clear [about the interests and intentions of the third player in this fandango — the United States.

Nothing spooks the US more than nuclear weapons in the hands of other than the five so-called Non-Prolifera-tion Treaty (NPT)-recognised nuclear weapon states. The mere suspicion that Saddam HusstSft was angling for an atom bomb led to Iraq's being Bushwhacked.

The strategy of pre-emption and preventive war, articulated by US President George W. Bush, has provided justification for this action. According to it, any and all threats to the US, however remote, are to be nipped in the bud by whatever means, including war. And weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), especially of the nuclear variety, are perceived by Washington as posing the greatest threat to US security and world order. Over the years, Republican and Democratic Party administrations alike have supported strong counter-proliferation measures when more peaceable ones have not worked.

But the American fear of proliferation, whatever the rhetoric, turned serious only after the trauma of 9/11. How else to explain Washington's turning a Nelson's eye over the previous two decades to China's supplying nuclear weapon design and production technology and missile wherewithal (directly and via North Korea) to Pakistan, and to Islamabad's barely-disguised build-up of the Kahuta centrifuges? It served the US interests to have Pakistan as a "frontline state" helping the US discomfit the Soviet occupation troops in Afghanistan and later fight Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda cohort there, whence its nuclear transgressions were forgiven, that is until now.

Pakistan has been "outed" as a nuclear rogue supplier for a reason. The conjunction between the Islamabad-run nuclear "grey" market and the Al Qaeda brand of uncompromising terrorism has conjured up the spectre of jihadis exploding smuggled "radiological dispersion devices" or, worse, "suitcase bombs", in the heart of Manhattan. The Russian secretary for national security, General Alexander Lebed, visiting Washington in 1997, revealed that 132 of these bombs are missing from a total of some 300-odd in the ex-Soviet inventory. It was too real a danger for the George W. Bush administration to ignore.

This, as much as the fight against the Al Qaeda, has led to the US establishing a military presence in Pakistan, virtually controlling the Pakistani air space out of its main base in Jacobabad, and wresting control from a harried and pressured General Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistan Army of the most critical part of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal — the nuclear component of the nuclear weapons. The awarding of "major non-NATO ally" status to that country, in the event, is a sop to dampen the growing resentmentwithin the Pakistani establishment.

Islamabad acquiesced in this arrangement because it was confronted with Hobson's choice: either allow its nuclear weapons to be neutered in this way, or face the prospect of the Pakistani'weapons being publicly and forcefully eliminated. General Musharraf chose the former course. A careful content analysis of various statements by General Musharraf and Abdul Sattar in the.aftermath of 9/11, when he was foreign minister, carried out by this writer—which because ofspace constraints cannot be detailed here — and other supporting evidence, like the movement of US and Israeli (and even Indian) Special Forces at the time, substantiates this thesis. Pakistani government has, however, been permitted to ballyhoo the fiction of readily available nuclear weapons for the purposes of dealing with the "threat" from India.

Besides, it would not do to broadcast this last development because it will lose Washingtonpowerful leverage with the Indian government. Better, from the American (and, in the circumstances, also the Pakistani) point of view, to reinforce the mindless Indian fixation with the "nuclear threat" from Pakistan to keep India alarmed, distracted and contained to South Asia—something that was originally achieved by China's assisting Pakistan to go nuclear and the US government's providing it protection against its own strong non-proliferation laws.

A part of the US agenda to effectively nuclear disarm the subcontinent has been achieved vis-a-vis Pakistan. Washington is now turning itsattention to New Delhi with the intent of peacefully pre-empting tbe Indian nuclear deterrent A partial victory has already been- scored. Ashley Tel-h's, formerly senior adviser to the US ambassador in India, has revealed the deal cut in the 19 rounds of the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks held post-Pokharan-n, whereby India agreed not to resume nuclear testing, change the present "de-alerted, de-mated" nuclear posture, or develop intercontinental ballistic missiles in mtiim for nromises of transfer ofihigh-technology, like civil-[ian advanced reactors, and technological collaboration in space. Senior Bush administration officials admit that the "glide path" is a diplomatic ploy and no real high-value technology will be in the pipeline, at least not until Washington gains real confidence in India, which may be the same as New Delhi's doing what it is asked to do by the US.

• bharat karnad is Research Professor at the Centre for Policy Research and author of Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security

IN THE SECOND OF A TWO-PART SERIES ON NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA, BHARAT KARNAD EXAMINES WHAT INDIA CAN DO TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR PEACE

Sovereignty characterises the modem nation-state, a quality best reflected in the ability of a country to protect itself. While the globalisation imperative has done away with autarchy, the fact is India and Pakistan are, for different reasons (discussed in the preceding part of this article) on the verge respectively of becoming a net importer of security from the United States and of being absorbed wholly in its global security system and, hence, of diluting their sovereignty. Curiously, it is potential gains in the realm of nuclear confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) that may help retrieve the situation somewhat for India and Pakistan.

Considering the high-pitched nuclear rhetoric in the past crises, the surprising feature of the subcontinental reality is its meta-stability. Consequent upon the terrorist attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001 and the exchange of hot words, the last thing one expected scant three weeks later was an exchange of lists, as per the 1991 agreement, of their respective nuclear sites and faculties, each with its pinpoint coordinates that both countries wanted protected against surprise strikes by the other. This, mind you, was at a time when first the Indian military, followed by its Pakistani counterpart, was gearing up for war.

If either side was at all serious about engaging in hostilities, keeping its trump card — nuclear weapons — in reserve for any contingency, would have been a reasonable and, arguably, prudent thing to do and would have strongly signalled that they meant business. Instead, an exchange of, what amounts to, lists of priority nuclear targets occurred. In the South Asian milieu, it is easier to talk nuclear war than prosecute one.

Organic links of culture, religion and shared history and the cataclysmic social consequences of waging wars of annihilation, restrains the two countries from doing so. This, as an analysis of India-Pakistan wars reveals, leaves the two countries free occasionally to fight limited and, relatively speaking, tame wars of manoeuvre that minimise loss of lives and material. Such wars, described by a former director of military operations of the Indian Army, Major General D.K. Palit, as "communal riots with tanks", are occasions for the people and governments to -blow off patriotic steam without renting the social fabric that ties the two nations together. It is a fact analysts and press commentators ignore when they talk blithely about this region as a "nuclear flash-point".

This is not to say there is no mutual distrust or that each side does not harbour suspicions about the other and, in the circumstances, that there is absolutely no danger of inadvertent and accidental nuclear exchange. Nuclear CSBMs are important because they are expected to zero out the risks, the India-Pakistan talks scheduled for May 25 will deal with a series of CSBMs, a few of which had currency during the Nato-Warsaw Pact nuclear face-off in the Cold War. Among them are crisis reduction centres, missile launch notifica-., tion (to give warning of the test-firing of missiles) — which formality India and Pakistan have adhered to, albeit spottily, over the years, etc.

More heartening still are indications that the Pakistan gov-> emment is not thinking in terms of a nuclear arms- race and accepts that there will be a disparity in the size and quality of the nuclear arsenals of the two countries. Indeed, 1he May 25' meeting may in fact explore the kind of disparity Pakistan will be "comfortable" with v These are excellent- signs that a nuclear modus vivendi may be in the offing.

But what the process desperately needs is the grand gesture that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has specialised in, an announcement so radical and dramatic as to turn topsy-turvy Pakistan's calculus. There are two such gestures New Delhi can make that will benefit Pakistan, security-wise, and may even lead to Islamabad's downplaying the Kashmir issue.

Firstly, India should unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all the Prithvi short range (150 km), liquid-fuelled, ballistic missiles from its border with Pakistan, both nuclearised and conventional warheaded (because they are difficult to differentiate). It should also undertake to provide verifiable evidence (satellite imagery, say) about such removal. As it is, the Prithvi systems as presently disposed (with the nuclear cores placed in well-guarded depots and separated from the weapon systems and these from the missile launchers) are worse than useless, they are a military liability in war. Being liquid fuelled, it takes time to pump fuel under high pressure into the rocket chamber and carrying the rocket fuel around and handling this highly corrosive liquid is onerous business. Worse, these aspects render the Prithvi system extremely vulnerable to detection, sabotage and pre-emptive strikes. This vulnerability is increased because the long convoy of Tetra trucks separately ferrying the radar, fuel, missile reloads, nuclear cores and the launcher are slow moving, easily visible to reconnais- sance drones, aircraft and satellites are easy to interdict. But, from their forward deployed positions the Prithvis fully cover Pakistan's "strategic corridor", running north to south near the Indian border, encompassing the most populous and wealth-producing areas of that country.

For this reason, this short range weapon system causes immense anxiety to Pakistan and is the source of nuclear instability because it compels Pakistan in a confrontation to try and take out these missiles with pre-emptive strikes. Its removal entails no risk whatsoever because any and all targets inside Pakistan are within the reach of the medium range (900 km) and intermediate range (2,000 km) Agni missiles fired from the hinterland. The Prithvis could be redeployed to the Tibet border with China, where it will do more good countering the Chinese short-range nuclear systems there. With this Prithvi gambit, who knows, in time a certain complementarity in the nuclear inventories may emerge with India featuring intermediate and continental range fusion weapons and Pakistan, effective short and medium-range fission armaments; and together they will be able to secure the subcontinent and stabilise the extended Indian Ocean and southern Asian regions!

In interactions with the Pakistani strategic community, this writer has elaborated on this CSBM. The reaction has been effusive. Asked how Islamabad would respond to such a gesture, Lieutenant General Moin-ud-Din Haider (Retd), the sometime interior minister in the Musharraf regime, for instance, replied, "Aap yeh kar ke to dekhain (Just see the good things that will Jnappen if you do this)" and indicated that it would be something of a climacteric in bilateral relations.

Apparently, the idea of withdrawing short range missiles from the border is now sufficiently accepted by the Pakistan establishment for retired foreign secretary, Naj-muddin Shaikh, to talk about' it as an issue for the forthcoming talks (Pakistan TV, Current Affairs Time, April 9). Should Islamabad decide to agree to such a proposal, it is fine. But for India to insist on reciprocity and negotiate withdrawal distances would be to display (he usual petty mindedness. that sparks ; Pakistafli' cussedness. It will ill-serve India's long-term national interest and possibly run the nuclear rapprochement process into the ground.

The other gesture India can make is get off the missile defence bandwagon. Missile defence may be touted by New Delhi as a purely defensive measure, but in Pakistan it has spawned fears that it will enable India to mount counter-force strikes on its nuclear assets with full confidence that such Pakistani retaliatory missiles as escape destruction, will be shot down. It is the sort of fear that animated Soviet Union's thinking and led to the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty and whose demise less than two years ago revived the Russian feelings of dread, leading Moscow to affirm that it will rely more centrally on its nuclear arsenal than ever before.

The problem is that comprehensive national missile defence is unattainable because the requisite technology will not be available in the foreseeable future. In other words, for the next 25-30 years at least a 100 per cent effective missile defence system is a pipe dream. And anything less, is no good at all. But, good or not, it will cost a bundle. According to American sources, the price tag for NMD for continental US will be in thousands of billions of dollars! To top it all, anti-missile systems can be easily defeated at a fraction of the cost by various low tech means. Like loosing off missiles to saturate the defence and shrouding nuclear warheads in mylar balloons to prevent infra-red detection by sensors on-board missile kill vehicles of the kind the US is developing for its NMD.

In the event, to invest in the US missile defence, economically and politically, is a strategically myopic, even foolish, move. It is for these and other reasons that a joint armed services committee in its report to the Indian defence ministry in 1996 rejected missile defence as a waste of money. Incidentally, it cost a small capability missile defence network at over Rs 55,000 crores!

The US wants India to sign up for missile defence because, as pointed out in the first lipattS of this article, it hopes by these means to keep India as a sub-strategic dependency and its nuclear force perennially underdeveloped. But what is the Indian government's excuse for going in for a leaky missile defence against the original advice of the military? Is it willing to undermine India's strategic independence and the prospects of enduring nuclear peace with Pakistan just to please Washington? In that case, India might as well give up its aspirations to great power⁷ status, because as a "subsidiary ally" of the US, it cannot become one.

Nuclear Terrorism: Today's Nuclear Threat

Nothing could have anything like the impact of a nuclear explosion, which could be more physically damaging, psychologically shocking, and politically disruptive than any event since World War II. Although the casualties from a single act of nuclear terrorism might not match those of a nuclear war, they would still dwarf other forms of terrorism by many orders of magnitude and could easily exceed those of most conventional wars.'

The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 brought home the willingness of a new breed of terrorists, now sometimes called 'new terrorists', to kill as many people as possible and cause the maximum amount of social and economic disruption. To discuss future terrorism it is useful and important to distinguish between the 'old' terrorists, who are likely to continue with 'business as usual', using conventional weapons to 'kill one and frighten thousands', and the 'new terrorists', who aim to 'kill thousands to frighten the hemisphere' with WMDs. Different types of 'old' terrorism can be identified:

• Political terrorism, usually with separatist or nationalist aims;

• Terrorism by far right- and left-wing political groups;

• Terrorism by single-issue groups, such as right-to-lifers and radical environmentalists; and

• Terrorism by an individual.

Current trends suggest that political terrorism with separatist or nationalist aims is likely to decrease in the future and terrorism by single-issue groups is likely to remain roughly constant, but the other types of terrorism are likely to increase.

THE NEW TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Terrorist actions by the 'new' terrorists - religious fundamentalists, particularly Islamic Fundamentalist groups and American Christian white supremacists - are likely to become increasingly frequent and violent. Whereas secular terrorists are likely to exercise constraint, and to avoid killing many when killing a few suits their purposes, religious fundamentalists are unlikely to feel any moral constraint about killing very large numbers of people.

In fact, mass killing by WMDs may fit well into the Armageddon and apocalyptic visions of some religious groups, some of which believe that they are under divine instruction to maximize killing and destruction. The likelihood that terrorist violence by fundamentalist groups will escalate to indiscriminate mass killing is the greatest future terrorist risk, the main consequence of increasing religious terror and decreasing radical political terror.

The best way the new terrorists can achieve their objective is to use a WMD. There is, therefore, clearly a danger, some would say an inevitability, that new terrorists will acquire, or develop and fabricate, and use WMDs - chemical, biological or nuclear.

Recent experience - for example, the use of nerve agents by the Aum Shinrikyo in Tokyo and of anthrax in the United States - shows that biological and chemical weapons are unpredictable and difficult to use effectively, that is, to cause a large number of casualties. Effective dispersal of both biological and chemical weapons is very difficult, so these weapons may not well serve the purposes of the new terrorists.

To fulfil their aims, therefore, I believe that future new terrorists are more likely to make nuclear attacks; these are not only more likely to succeed, but their Armageddon nature is likely to appeal to fundamentalists. Nuclear terrorism may be the most likely future use of nuclear explosives, replacing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries (nuclear-weapon proliferation) as perhaps the most serious threat to national security. The success of recent attacks against American targets indicates that nuclear weapons do not deter terrorism by protecting countries armed with nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence has no role in dealing with the new terrorism.

NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Nuclear terrorist groups may become involved in several activities:

• Stealing or otherwise acquiring fissile material and fabricating and detonating a primitive nuclear explosive;

• Making and detonating a radiological weapon to spread radioactive material;

• Attacking a nuclear-power reactor to disseminate radioactivity;

• Attacking the high-level radioactive waste tanks at reprocessing plants to spread the radioactivity contained within;

• Attacking a plutonium store to spread the plutonium contained within;

• Stealing or otherwise acquiring a nuclear weapon from the arsenal of a nuclear-weapon power and detonating it; and/or

• Attacking, sabotaging or hijacking a transporter of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials.

All these actions have the potential to cause large numbers of deaths.

Of these possibilities, terrorists will probably prefer to set off a nuclear explosive, perhaps using a stolen nuclear weapon or, more likely, a nuclear explosive fabricated by them from acquired fissile material. Terrorists would be satisfied with a nuclear explosive device that is far less sophisticated than the types of nuclear weapons demanded by the military. What is the risk that terrorists will fabricate and use a primitive nuclear explosive?

ACQUIRING FISSILE MATERIAL

As plutonium and highly-enriched uranium become more available worldwide, it is increasingly possible for a terrorist group to steal, or otherwise illegally acquire, civil or military fissile material that could be used to fabricate a nuclear explosive device. The group could then detonate, or threaten to detonate, its nuclear explosive. Large amounts of fissile material exist.

Terrorist groups may find it easiest to acquire plutonium produced in civil reprocessing plants. This can be used in nuclear weapons,² and has been tested by both the United States³ and the United Kingdom.⁴ About 300 tonnes of civil plutonium has been separated, about 80 tonnes in France, 56 tones in Japan, 40 tones each in Germany and Russia and smaller amounts in seven other countries.⁵ The total could rise to about 550 tones by 2010.⁶

HEU, though easier for terrorists to use (see below), may be more difficult to acquire. There are about 1,900 tones of HEU in the world, about 1,000 tones in Russia and 700 tones in the US; the UK has about 15 tones. Almost all this is military; only about 19 per cent civil, used mainly as fuel for research reactors.⁷ HEU can be more easily disposed of by mixing with natural or depleted uranium as low-enriched uranium, which can be used as reactor fuel but not as a nuclear explosive.

Of particular concern is the growing trade in civil MOX nuclear fuel. The plutonium oxide is produced in reprocessing plants by separating it from spent nuclear-power reactor fuel elements. If terrorists acquire MOX fuel, they could relatively easily remove the plutonium oxide from it chemically and use it to fabricate nuclear weapons. The global trade in MOX therefore increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Concern about the theft of fissile materials has been considerably enhanced by recent incidents of the smuggling of such materials from Russia. In December 1994 the Czech authorities seized three kilograms of HEU; security police were reported to have confiscated nearly 40 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium in December 1993 in Odessa in the Ukraine; more than 400 grammas of weapons-grade plutonium were seized in Germany in 1994. These and other smuggling incidents, which are almost certainly the tip of an iceberg, suggest that a significant black-market in fissile materials exists. If significant production of MOX fuel occurs at Sellafield, this would become a target for theft, particularly if it is traded abroad, as with Japan. Such possibilities have attracted attention with recent concern over whether Iraq could obtain nuclear-weapons capability.⁸

THE FISSION PROCESS

A nuclear explosion relies on producing a nuclear fission. chain reaction to obtain nuclear energy. A fission chain reaction can be produced and sustained using one of two fissile isotopes, plutonium-239 and uranium-235. These nuclei undergo fission when they absorb (capture) a neutron. A nuclear explosive can only be fabricated from one of these isotopes.

When a uranium-235 nucleus captures a neutron, a nucleus of the isotope uranium-236 is formed. This is very unstable and rapidly splits (fissions) into nuclei of elements of medium atomic numbers, called fission products, generally radioactive. Similarly, if a plutonium-239 nucleus captures a neutron, plutonium-240 is formed which is very unstable and rapidly fissions.

In addition to the fission products, neutrons are emitted during the fission process - on average, between two and three neutrons are emitted - and energy is given off. The fission process can be represented by:

uranium-235 + neutron —> uranium-236 —> X + Y + 2.5 neutrons + energy

Or, where X and Y are fission products:

plutonium-239 + neutron —> plutonium-240 —> X + Y + 2.5 neutrons + energy

Energy is released during fission because the masses of the fission products (X and Y) and the fission neutrons is less than the mass of the uranium-236 nucleus. By Einstein's famous equation (E = Me²) the extra mass becomes energy; c, the velocity of light, is a huge number and, therefore, the amount of energy given off is very large.

THE CRITICAL MASS

If at least one of the neutrons produced when a nucleus undergoes fission produces the fission of another nucleus, a fission chain reaction is produced and maintained for a long enough time to produce an adequate explosion. The minimum mass of a fissile material that can sustain a nuclear fission chain reaction is called the critical mass.

If a mass of plutonium-239 or uranium-235 is increased above the critical level, the number of neutrons produced by fission builds up and considerably more fissions occur in each successive generation of fission. When the rate of production of fissile neutrons exceeds all neutron losses, a supercritical mass is created and a rapid and uncontrollable increase in the number of neutrons within the mass of fissile material occurs, producing enough energy to cause a nuclear explosion.

DESIGNING A PRIMITIVE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE

Terrorist groups are likely to be satisfied with a nuclear explosive device that is far less sophisticated than the types of nuclear weapons demanded by the military. The military demand that their nuclear weapons are highly reliable and explode with an explosive yield that can be accurately predicted; a terrorist group would be much less demanding and satisfied with a relatively unsophisticated device, much easier to design and fabricate.

Three designs of crude nuclear explosives would be adequate for most purposes of a terrorist group intent on nuclear terrorism. The first is a gun-type nuclear explosive device using HEU as the fissile material. This is the simplest crude device to design and construct and the one most likely to produce a powerful nuclear explosion.

The second is an implosion-type nuclear explosive device using a solid sphere of plutonium metal as the fissile material - a crude version of the atomic bomb that destroyed Nagasaki. This is the most difficult of the three to design and construct, but within the capabilities of a significantly large terrorist group.

The third, an implosion-type device using plutonium oxide as the fissile material, is perhaps the most likely nuclear device to be constructed by terrorists because of the increasing and widespread availability of plutonium oxide. It may be the most attractive of the three designs to terrorists because of the threat of the widespread dispersion of large amounts of plutonium even if the device produces no nuclear explosion. Using Highly-Enriched Uranium

Luis Alvarez, a nuclear-weapon physicist, has emphasized the ease of constructing a nuclear explosive with HEU:

With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so low that terrorists, if they have such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated highly-enriched uranium is at hand it's a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion ... even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order.⁹

A primitive gun-type weapon could comprise a cylindrical 'barrel' 50 centimeters in length and eight centimeters in diameter, with a 40-kilogram mass of 90 per cent uranium-235 HEU at the bottom. This would be hollowed-out to the shape of a 15-kilogram mass of HEU at the top, with a high-explosive charge above it to be detonated electronically. The whole device could weigh about 300 kilograms, transportable by, and detonated in, an ordinary van.

Such a weapon could explode with the equivalent of several hundred, perhaps several thousand, tones of TNT. For comparison, the largest conventional bomb used in the Second World War, the 'earthquake bomb', contained about ten tones of TNT. The bomb used by Timothy McVeigh against the Federal Building in Oklahoma weighed about three tones.

The critical mass of crystalline plutonium oxide is about 35 kilograms, metallic reactor-grade plutonium is about 13 kilograms.¹⁰ A sphere of the fissile material would be placed in the centre of a spherical shape of about 200 kilograms conventional high explosive, such as Semtex. If it were also surrounded by a tamper/reflector of beryllium or uranium the critical mass would be smaller but the explosive yield greater.

Such a device would have a radius of around 40 centimeters. It would be surrounded by a large number of detonators to be fired simultaneously by an electronic circuit triggered by a timer or a remote radio signal. It might explode with a power of a few tens to hundreds of tones of TNT, enough to devastate a city centre (see below). Plate 6 shows an artist's impression of what Trafalgar Square, London might look like after an explosion which only 'fizzled'. Even if there were no nuclear explosion and the plutonium was only scattered, it would be widely dispersed - as small particles if an incendiary material were mixed with the high explosive.

If inhaled, such material is very likely to cause lung cancer. The half-life of plutonium-239 is 24,000 years; Chapter 8 shows the difficulty ofcleaning-up a remote area. A city centre so attacked could be uninhabitable for months or years and the initial explosion would cause mass panic over a much wider area.

EFFECTS OF A PRIMITIVE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION

A 100-tonne nuclear explosion would produce a crater about 30 metres across. The lethal area for prompt radiation after such an explosion (1.2 square kilometres) is larger than that for blast (0.4 square kilometre) or heat (0.1 square kilometre). Anyone in the open within 600 metres would probably be killed by these direct effects." For an explosion in Trafalgar Square, London the area would extend from Cambridge Circus to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Whitehall. Other deaths would be caused by buildings collapsing or debris falling and by fires from broken gas pipes or petrol in cars; the effects of fires could exceed those from the direct effects of heat. Many square kilometers (in this example, most of central London) would be contaminated by radioactive fallout.

Such an explosion would paralyze the emergency services. Many seriously injured would die from lack of care, from delays to ambulances and releasing those trapped in buildings. In the UK there are only a few hundred burns beds in the whole National Health Service. Panic could affect even trained emergency personnel, especially from awareness of radioactive fallout.

Thermal radiation from an explosion of this size would kill within one minute those outside or near windows up to 200 meters away. Blast would kill up to 800 meters away, prompt radiation up to one kilometer (in this example, all of Soho, the Royal National Theatre and Westminster Abbey). Heat injuries would extend to one kilometer and blast to two kilometers (including the Elephant and Castle, Euston and Victoria stations - Map 2).

The nuclear electronic pulse would damage communications equipment out to two kilometers and electronic equipment to ten kilometers (Stratford, Streatham and Willesden). This would have severe consequences for fire and police services and hospitals.

Assuming a 24-kilometres/hour wind, fallout would cause acute radiation sickness to those exposed in the open in a cigar-shaped area ten kilometers long and up to two kilometers wide. The risk of cancer long-term would extend about 80 kilometers downwind (with the prevailing south-westerly wind, almost to Colchester). Plutonium would be widely dispersed; depending on how uniformly it was distributed, an even larger area could, according to international regulations, need to be evacuated and decontaminated.

PREVENTION

In the short-term, vital measures against nuclear (and other) terrorism include efficient protection of key nuclear (and biological and chemical) materials and facilities, with effective intelligence on the activities of terrorist groups capable of such actions. So far as nuclear terrorism is concerned, special attention should be given to the control of plutonium. This protection must take into account the relatively small amounts of plutonium needed to make a nuclear explosive.

Society may decide that the terrorist risk of acquiring and using a nuclear explosive, and the awesome consequences of such use, are such that some nuclear activities should be given up. An obvious example is the reprocessing of spent nuclear-power reactor fuel to separate the plutonium from it and the use of this plutonium to produce MOX fuel for nuclear reactors. The steps of chemically separating the plutonium oxide from uranium oxide in MOX, converting the oxide into plutonium metal and assembling the metal or plutonium oxide together with conventional explosive to produce a nuclear explosion are not technologically demanding and do not require materials from specialist suppliers. The information required to carry out these operations is freely available in the open literature.

None of the concepts involved in understanding how to separate the plutonium are difficult; a second-year undergraduate would be able to devise a suitable procedure by reading standard reference works, consulting the open literature in scientific journals and searching the internet. A small number, three or so, of people with appropriate skills could separate the plutonium from MOX and design and fabricate a crude nuclear explosive. All the nuclear-physics data needed to design a crude nuclear explosive device are available in the open literature.

The storage and fabrication of MOX fuel assemblies, their transportation and storage at conventional nuclear-power stations on a scale currently envisaged by the nuclear industry will be extremely difficult to safeguard and protect. The risk of diversion or theft of MOX fuel by terrorist groups is an alarming possibility. The risk is thought by many to be great enough to justify the argument that the reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel and the production and use of MOX fuel should be stopped.

But in the long run, the best, and perhaps the only, way to defeat nuclear - and other - terrorism is to remove people's justified grievances and to improve their social welfare.

THE FUTURE

So much for the past: what of the future? As interpreted by the ICJ, the NPT commits the NWSs to achieve nuclear disarmament and at the Review Conference in 2000 the NWSs committed themselves to elimination.¹⁴ The British Pugwash Group reviewed the options and, as summarized by Sebastian Pease in Chapter 12, concluded that the most feasible possibility is to undertake now not to replace Trident.¹⁵ Unless military nuclear facilities are opened to IAEA inspection, this is not verifiable and implies that the UK, although now the smallest of the five NPT NWSs, will remain a nuclear power until perhaps 2030 - scarcely an encouragement to the others. Indeed, press reports suggest that plans for the immediate future of the AWE at Aldermaston at least leaves open its capacity to prepare for a successor to Trident.

As Tom Milne comments (Chapter 1), majority public opinion has always opposed this country becoming a non-nuclear-weapons state until all others do likewise. However, the Pugwash report (quoted by Pease) notes that the nuclear threat has not been a matter of public concern for several years and we wonder if their conclusion may be too pessimistic. Scrapping Trident would certainly be a nine-day wonder, but in today's political climate it surely need no longer make a political party unelec-table. Rob Green has suggested elsewhere that the UK should announce the decommissioning of the Trident nuclear programme at the 2005 NPT review conference. He believes that doing so would transform the debateon nuclear disarmament - and perhaps earn the Prime Minister of the day a Nobel Peace Prize.¹⁶

Of course, the nuclear powers also have individual reasons for wanting to maintain nuclear capability and there can be no certainty that others would follow our lead. Additionally, as many nuclear apologists have pointed out, knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons will always be with us. This implies an even more radical need - an end to war.¹⁷ The contents of this book, we believe, show that in the 50 years since the first test explosion, the UK nuclear programme has caused significant harm while achieving little or nothing. The start of the second 50 years surely provides an opportunity to do better.

In addition to expanding the Dialogues With Decision Makers program to include as many affiliates as possible in a global disarmament advocacy effort, IPPNW affiliates in NATO countries will engage in a coordinated campaign to raise public and governmental awareness regarding the contradictions between NATO nuclear policies and national disarmament obligations under the NPT. This part of the campaign will focus on four specific policy demands: that NATO member states facilitate entry into force of the CTBT and inform the US that a nuclear test would be unacceptable to the rest of the alliance; adoption of an unconditional no-first-use policy for NATO; permanent withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from all non-nuclear NATO member states; and an end to NATO’s nuclear sharing policy.

Other elements of the campaign will include outreach to the recently formed Blix Commission on weapons of mass destruction, support for the Mayors for Peace initiative to bring a civil-society-sponsored disarmament resolution to the 2005 NPT PrepCom, and international activities that can insert a broader global perspective into the US policy debate on security, military spending, and disarmament.

1. The NPT PrepCom

IPPNW aims to play a major role at the final Preparatory Committee meeting before the all-important 2005 NPT Review, with a presentation on the "human face" of the nuclear threat. According to IPPNW President Ron McCoy:

"We know what almost 60 years under the nuclear shadow have done to the hundreds of thousands of victims, whether they be hibakusha, downwinders, nuclear industry workers, or communities in the Global South and elsewhere who have been deprived of true health and security because of the enormous amount of resources squandered on acquiring, testing, and developing nuclear weapons. In a more general sense, we are all victims of the preparations for nuclear war, because we are all held hostage to the ever present threat of extinction."

Elaborating on US intentions to manufacture a new generation of nuclear weapons, including nuclear "bunker busters" that could be used against suspected underground chemical and biological weapons facilities, Dr. McCoy writes:

"To categorize nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons together under the single rubric ‘weapons of mass destruction,’ without making fundamental distinctions regarding the scales of destructive effect, betrays a lack of understanding. To do so for the political purpose of defining uses for nuclear weapons against chemical and biological threats – for example, nuclear-armed bunker busters designed to destroy underground chemical or biological weapons facilities – or to threaten nuclear retaliation against a chemical or biological attack, is a cynical betrayal of the global responsibility to ensure that these weapons are never used again."

NGO Summary Recommendations
DRAFT THREE
April 16, 2004


Frederick Douglass stated ³Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet
deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the
ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. ...Power concedes
nothing without a demand.²



We would like to conclude this body of presentations by reiterating our demand for a nuclear free world and making some specific recommendations for how to get there. States Parties have two sets of recommendations to make to the Review conference next year-- one on procedural issues, and one on the more substantive issues. Since substance and procedure are often inextricably related, there are elements of both in many of the following recommendations.


Recommendation 1: Disarm

We have heard from policy makers in the Nuclear Weapon States that the NGOs put too much emphasis on nuclear disarmament at the expense of reining in proliferation. We uncategorically reject this assessment and demand that the Nuclear Weapon States stop trying to change the subject. Disarmament is the foundation of all non-proliferation efforts and of the Treaty itself, and we urge the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT to join us in holding the Nuclear Weapon States accountable to their obligations. Governments should allocate financial and personnel resources in their own countries to implement their disarmament commitments under the Treaty. New Zealand, for example, has a disarmament minister and we encourage all states to create similar high-level positions. At the same time, the non-nuclear weapons states must refrain from threats of their own- either explicit or covert- to break out of the NPT. This is a tall order. Nonetheless, you are all under contract, as it were, and we expect delivery.

The following specific actions should be taken without further delay:

A) A clear timeframe for the total abolition of all nuclear weapons should be established- no later than 2020, and negotiations should commence as of the 2005 NPT Review on a phased program of incremental steps leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons  within that timeframe. A specific course of milestones to reach in verification technology, in storage capability, in disposal plans, and in other aspects of dismantling and destroying existing nuclear arsenals would serve as a plan of action by which to measure progress. While attempts were made to do this with the 13 Steps of the 2000 Final Document, time bound targets were not attached to any of the goals and incessant backsliding has been the result. We recommend that the United Nations convene a Summit meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a prelude to the opening of negotiations on a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. A deadline of no later than the 2010 NPT Review should be set for completion of those negotiations and submission of the Convention for sgnature and ratification. Within this framework, an International Nuclear Disarmament Organization should be created, with the authority and resources to facilitate the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world¹s arsenals by no later than 2020 and to monitor this nuclear-free status for the foreseeable future. [1]

B) As a good faith step, the world¹s nuclear weapon states, acknowledged or unacknowledged in this Treaty, must end the design and development of new nuclear weapons and cease deployment programs. [2] This body should explicitly condemn policies that seek to justify preemptive nuclear strikes. It should also condemn the creation of new generations of nuclear weapons, as well as new justifications for them, which contradict the letter and spirit of the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states should discard policies that make them dependent upon the nuclear weapons of others for their security. The States Parties to the NPT should place unrelenting pressure on States that have not yet ratified the CTBT‹particularly the Annex B states and the two nuclear weapon states who have not yet ratified. [3] All forms of nuclear testing, including sub-critical testing, must be prohibited. As citizens of many of these countries, we are embarrassed and angry that their governments are so invested in cold-war era concepts of nuclear defense that they would not ratify a treaty whose objective is to prevent the widespread harm of nuclear testing. We must remember the faces of the hibakusha, of the atomic veterans, of the downwinders, of the indigenous peoples throughout the world who have suffered because of nuclear testing, and we must make every effort to prevent this from happening again.

C) Disarmament of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons must go hand-in hand with disarmament of the warheads themselves. Testing of both missiles and missile defense systems must stop. Negotiations should commence for an international treaty banning testing and deployment of ballistic missiles and of missile defense systems. Research, development, testing, building, and deployment of weapons for use in space should be prohibited. [4]

Recommendation 2: No New Nuclear Reactors

We urge a moratorium on the building of new nuclear reactors as old ones are closed down. Funds from Export Credit Agencies and government subsidies for new nuclear power plants should be transferred to an International Sustainable Energy Fund. [5]

Recommendation 3: Implement and Strengthen the NPT in a Non-Discriminatory Manner That Demands Accountability

States Parties to the NPT -- particularly the nuclear weapon states but also non-nuclear states that are the focus of breakout concerns -- must be held to a higher standard of reporting on their Treaty compliance than presently exists. Substantive reporting should be viewed as part of the infrastructure of monitoring, verification, and enforcement of the NPT and its disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

In particular:

A) Step 12 of the 13 Steps obliges all states to provide regular reports on implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on ³Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.² The number of States submitting these reports must increase, as must the quality and frequency of reporting, so that they can fulfill their potential as an important transparency tool. [6]

B) Treaty-based, multilateral mechanisms to address disarmament and non-proliferation goals must be strengthened, so that reliance on unilateral or plurilateral measures for enforcement and verification will not become the norm. In particular, concerns regarding suspected or documented horizontal proliferation such as those seen most recently in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya must be handled within the context of the NPT and the IAEA. Where necessary, the capacity to address those concerns within the Treaty framework must be reinforced. Similarly, the capabilities for addressing and halting vertical proliferation and for enforcing progress toward the elimination of all nuclear arsenals must be built up. Mechanisms that should be considered include a permanent NPT body, and a UN-based inspectorate, drawing on UNMOVIC capabilities. [7]

C) NPT Member States should make common cause with those responsible for implementing the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in pursuit of effective and mutually reinforcing systems for verification and enforcement. [8]

D) As one of its responsibilities, a new NPT Secretariat (see Recommendation 7, below) should formally consider the findings of civil-society-based teams of ³citizen inspectors² to assist it in the task of global fact finding with regard to NPT compliance. Citizen inspectors should be recognized as legitimate gatherers of information in nuclear weapon states and in non-nuclear weapon states allegedly conducting clandestine nuclear weapons programs, regarding the locations of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; targets and suspected targets; policies governing their intended uses; and the fulfillment of disarmament commitments. [9]

Recommendation 4: Insist That International Means International

We have discussed our growing concern today that binding international agreements that serve the goals of common global security are being replaced by unilateral and plurilateral strategies of counterproliferation that primarily serve the interests of the most powerful states. The goal of the NPT is to achieve global disarmament under ³strict and effective international control,² and no one Member State or group of Member States acting as a ³coalition of the willing² should be allowed to dominate the discussion about how and when to implement the Treaty, or to exempt themselves from its provisions.

Specifically:

A) In order to accomplish the Article VI goal of nuclear disarmament, irreversible steps to reduce nuclear weapons holdings are essential. In this regard, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the US and Russia should be brought into conformance with the principles of transparency and irreversibility reflected in the 13 Steps. NPT Member States should incorporate the measures enacted by the G8 in the Global Partnership Program into a broader, well-funded multilateral verification framework under IAEA controls. [10]

B) As part of the effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, as well as to promote the goal of nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East and elsewhere, the NPT Member States should send formal invitations for official observers from Israel, India, and Pakistan at the NPT PrepComs and Reviews, and develop mechanisms for giving them greater access to NPT deliberations. [11]

C) Negotiations should commence immediately on a multilateral treaty banning the shipment of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Any strengthening of the right to intercept shipments, which affects both sovereignty and use of force issues, should proceed through legitimate multilateral lawmaking, and within an accountable and equitable multilateral framework.

D) Fissile materials considered excess to the military programs of the nuclear weapons states must be brought under IAEA safeguards, consistent with Article III of the NPT as affirmed in the 2000 Final Document. [12] We support the recommendations of Mr. ElBaradei that parts of the nuclear fuel cycle should be brought under multinational control and that export controls should be universalized. Tough, on-site inspections must be universally accepted. So long as States maintain the foolhardy claim to nuclear power, dangerous fissile materials should not be in the hands of a few States, but should be internationalized and monitored heavily by an international agency such as the IAEA. [13]

E) The withdrawal clause of the NPT should be revised. A method should be established to convene the Member States to begin negotiations with any State threatening to withdraw from the Treaty, with the goal of settling any differences or disputes that may be the root cause of a States desire to withdraw.

F) The role of the IAEA in verification of peaceful nuclear activities must be supported through both financial and political commitments to the safeguard and verification regime. Member States should create a permanent monitoring and verification unit under the UN umbrella and based on the expertise of UNMOVIC. [14]

G) Provisions exist which allow for the presence and participation of the IAEA during NPT Prepcoms and Review Conferences- these provisions should also be extended to the CTBTO who should be granted access to all NPT  related meetings and be given an opportunity to address the general debate.  This could encourage a speedier entry- into force for that treaty, by providing an opportunity for the CTBTO to address issues related to verification, monitoring and on-site inspections.

Recommendation 5: Enhance NGO Access

As the cornerstone of accountability, transparency with regard to the implementation of NPT obligations is called for in the 13 Steps. Closed door meetings, however, represent the antithesis to this. An essential element of transparency is NGO participation in the NPT Review Process, which has the secondary effect of allowing states to benefit from the considerable expertise within civil society. To this end, we urge this meeting to recommend to the 2005 Review Conference that NGO participants be granted increased access to the proceedings, including fewer closed sessions allowing NGO observers to attend cluster discussions, and timely access to documentation.

Recommendation 6: Strengthen Member State Reporting

In the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, states agreed to submit regular reports on their progress toward disarmament. We note that there have been more reports submitted at each of the three PrepComs since 2000, and urge states to continue strengthening this important transparency tool. While a standardized reporting mechanism might increase ease of reporting, and the NGO Shadow Report prepared by Reaching Critical Will provides one such model, we would encourage increased participation before negotiations of a standard format. Substantive statements on the part of the nuclear weapon states about nuclear holdings and fissile material stocks, operational status and doctrine, would be an important confidence building measure and encourage others to report as well. Translation and distribution of these reports will be an important contribution to the institutional memory of the NPT -- but the question remains, who is the custodian of institutional memory?

Recommendation 7: Create an NPT Secretariat

In the absence of an NPT Secretariat, many functions and responsibilities either fall by the wayside, or are dealt with ineffectively in an ad-hoc way. To whom are reports submitted and archived?  Who is monitoring this crucial function?  To whom do States lodge complaints or suspicions of non-compliance? An NPT Secretariat is necessary at this time.  Such an institution could be modeled on the OPCW, and would serve as an interim body until there is a Nuclear Weapons Convention, nuclear weapons have been eliminated at long last, and we have no more need for the NPT at all.

To create such an institution, States Parties of the NPT must contribute adequate personal and financial resources.  They must identify a host country and develop the terms of reference for the institution, including its relationship with the IAEA.  We have confidence that these tasks could be done with the assistance of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, and encourage Member States to recommend this procedural modification to the NPT.  

Another function that an NPT Secretariat could play would be to conduct meetings with states outside of the NPT to encourage their participation, in much the same way that the CTBT provisional secretariat meets with states that have not yet ratified that treaty.

The only meaningful measure to gauge the effectiveness of the NPT is the progress and the pace of efforts by the Nuclear Weapon States to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. If the Nuclear Weapon States comply with their NPT obligations under Article VI, non-proliferation will be easier to ensure. If they do not and the nuclear double standard articulated most explicitly by the United States continues to dominate this forum, proliferation will be impossible to stop and nuclear war itself will become unpreventable. Therefore, every substantive recommendation of the NGO community made in this summation serves one, underlying purpose: to challenge the States Parties to the NPT to summon the political will required to put global nuclear disarmament on a strict, short, and unambiguous timetable. As representatives of civil society - as those who have entrusted you with the job of eliminating these genocidal weapons from the world¹s arsenals- we expect action, not a proliferation of excuses for inaction.

Key to NGO Presentations That Elaborate on Specific Recommendations

1. Mayors for Peace Resolution/Vertical proliferation [Akiba/Butcher]
2. Vertical proliferation [Butcher]
3. Reaffirming the 13 Steps [Estabrooks]
4. Missile Defense and Space Weaponization [Hagen]
5. Horizontal Proliferation [Slater]
6. Reaffirming the 13 Steps [Estabrooks]
7. Plurilateralism/Multilateralism [Tyson/Burroughs]
8. Human Tragedy of Proliferation and Nuclear Re-armament [Loretz]
9. Grassroots Initiatives [Leeper]
10. Reaffirming the 13 Steps [Estabrooks]
11. Middle East [Mohtasham]
12. Reaffirming the 13 Steps [Estabrooks]
13. Plurilateralism/Multilateralism [Tyson/Burroughs]
14. Reaffirming the 13 Steps [Estabrooks]

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that die benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end, Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between the States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows:

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency s safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peacefuluses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any here.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. ForStates depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or in international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude an charge for research and development Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties -which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any Party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragrapn 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized it supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

"...To summarize, we demand here and now that, when the States Parties review the NPT in 2005, you take that opportunity to pass by majority vote, regardless of any nations that may oppose it, a call for the immediate de-alerting of all nuclear weapons, for unequivocal action toward dismantling and destroying all nuclear weapons in accordance with a clearly stipulated timetable, and for negotiations on a universal Nuclear Weapons Convention establishing a verifiable and irreversible regime for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 'Impossible,' some will say. "The nuclear powers will never agree.' But just as plants can get along fine without human beings, people are ultimately the power behind their leaders. The time has come for the people to arise and let our militarist, competitivist leaders know where the real power lies. The time has come to go beyond words, reason and non-binding treaties. The time has come to impose economic sanctions on any nation that insists on maintaining nuclear weapons. The time has come to use demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycotts, and every nonviolent means at our disposal to oppose the destruction of millions of our brothers and sisters, the destruction of our habitat and the extermination of our species. The time has come to fight, nonviolently, for our lives."

"All of us in this room today, blessed with extremely high levels of prosperity and education, are duty-bound to educate the rest of the population in our countries about the nuclear danger. We must inform them and mobilize them for their own protection. It is our responsibility to launch a massive, grassroots campaign that will make it clear that the people of all nations will accept only leaders who undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear weapons.

"The military industrial complex is too powerful,' some will say. I have no illusions about what happens when the people seek to correct their rulers. It took a hundred years and a terribly bloody war to free the slaves in the US, then another century to free them from the terror of lynchings and the humiliation of segregation. It took 30 years for Gandhi to free India from British rule. It took 15 years to stop the Vietnam War. Bottom-up change takes time and great sacrifice, but, unfortunately, people of moral and spiritual vision must again take up the struggle. The abolition of nuclear weapons is no less important and no less just than the abolition of slavery. We are not just fighting a technology or a weapon. As Martin Luther King Jr. said, we are fighting nuclear weapons in our own minds. We are fighting the very idea that anyone could, for any reason, unleash a nuclear holocaust. We are fighting the idea that a small group of powerful men should have the capacity to launch Armageddon. We are fighting the idea that we should spend trillions of dollars on military overkill while billions of us live in dire, life-threatening poverty.

Our immediate target is nuclear weapons, but our long-term aim is a new world order. In this new world, no man is foolish enough to kill or be killed to defend his master's wealth or ego. We seek a world in which no man, woman or child goes to bed wondering whether he or she will live through the hunger, pestilence, or violence of the next day; a world in which we look around this room and see not murdering, thieving enemies against whom we have to defend ourselves but brothers and sisters on whom our own safety, security, survival and enjoyment depend.

You will soon be hearing about a new campaign to abolish nuclear weapons. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, supported by the World Conference of Mayors for Peace, which represents 555 cities and over 250 million people around the world, will work with anyone willing to help design, develop, and implement this campaign. Please join us. Please support the campaign in any way you can. Let us work together for the sake of our children and grandchildren. Let us ban nuclear weapons in 2005."

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