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Reforms
of the UN
A discussion paper on ‘Report of the UN High-level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change”
published
for the conference of the
European Network for Peace and
Human Rights
European Parliament, Brussels
20-21 October 2005
Vijay
Mehta
Introduction
The purpose of this report is to suggest
how nations can work together to meet the challenges to peace and security in
the 21st century. The report, called ‘A more secure world: Our shared responsibility’, contains
recommendations on changes that could be made within the United Nations system
so that it can better address today’s threats and security challenges.
The 60th anniversary of the United Nations in 2005, is a fitting occasion to take stock of achievements and failures of the world body. The history of the United Nations has included some remarkable successes, the decolonisation and ending of apartheid in South Africa, poverty alleviation, protection of rights of children, promotion of democracy, protection of environmental, gender and human rights issues are no small achievements. It has brought humanitarian relief to 20 millions refugees and a further 110 million are fed per year through World Food Program. It has helped people rebuild countries from ruins of war. The United Nations over 30 years, has maintained peace and order in difficult circumstances in such diverse places as Cambodia, Mozambique, Cyprus and Kashmir. The joint United Nations programme on HIV/AIDS remains a focal point for global efforts to defeat the spread of AIDS epidemic, while the WHO coordinated the global response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). At the
same token the failures of the United Nations have, from time to time, been
quite stark. The United Nations has acted unwisely at times and failed to act
all together at other times. One need only to think of the peacekeeping
disasters of Somalia in 1993, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and the “safe
areas” in Bosnia in 1994-95. The
United Nations has also passed resolutions on the Israel – Palestine conflict,
Iraq etc. which it had no intention of keeping. But the United Nations at its
best is only a mirror of the world. It reflects divisions and disagreements as
well hopes and convictions. Some times it only muddles through. As Dag
Hammerskjold, the United Nation's second Secretary General, put it, “the UN
was not created to take humanity to heaven but save it from hell”.
In more recent times, the United Nations was marginalised when the United States (and its ‘coalition of the willing’) unilaterally attacked Iraq. This prompted Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General, to appoint a 16-member panel of eminent persons to report on threats to international peace and security in the coming century and recommendations on how to deal with them.
Threats
to peace and international security- 6 main areas
The report is a comprehensive assessment
of the threats faced by all nations and offers recommendations on how the United
Nations system should be reformed to meet those threats. It contains 101 recommendations for dealing with the six areas identified by the
Panel as being the greatest challenges to worldwide security in the future. The
areas are: continued poverty and environmental degradation, terrorism, civil
war, conflict between states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
and organized crime.
The report is perhaps the most
far-reaching official review, since 1945 and the signing the United Nations
Charter, of the United Nation’s role, in particular in the fields of peace and
security. It is a report which is policy driven and member-states need to act
urgently if the United Nations is to continue to remain an important player in
world affairs. Unlike other United Nations reports, including the 1992 Agenda
for Peace by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, wherein member-states took little action to
implement recommendations.
The report took into account that we
live in an interdependent world where the threat agenda cannot be categorised
into previous modes of thinking; namely ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ threats. The
problems of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction cannot be adequately solved without dealing with the phenomena of
the failure of states. This often leads to major regional instability and
conflicts and a whole range of issues, which have not traditionally been
considered as part of the peace and security nexus at all – poverty,
environmental degradation, pandemic diseases and the spread of organised crime
– to mention the most prominent.
Every one of these threats requires a
universal response if it is to be effectively dealt with. Only a broad, common
agenda provides any hope of mustering such a universal response. As the problems
are interrelated, the report reaffirms that a multilateral approach is a key
ingredient to solving these global challenges.
The interventions in Kosovo and Iraq
highlight the illegitimacy of the use of force where no mandate was authorised
by the Security Council for going to war. The report concludes that Article 51
of the UN Charter, which recognises the use of force for self-defence, should be ‘neither rewritten nor interpreted.’ It
does, however, endorse the emerging norm that there is a ‘responsibility to protect’, where sovereign governments fail to protect, their citizens in the event of
genocide and wide-scale human rights violations. In such instances the Security
Council may authorise military intervention as a last resort if the decision has
been taken collectively.
To stop the risk of countries sliding into chaos, state collapse and becoming a haven for terrorists, a Peacebuilding Commission is recommended to take a proactive approach in preventing future instability. In particular, it seeks to work with national governments to assist the transition from conflict to post-conflict peacebuilding. More advanced systems of prevention are needed to assist developing countries in halting terrorists finding shelter in weak states.
Countering
the spread of nuclear weapons and WMDs
The report recognised that the various
international rules to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
– nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological – were under great strain.
A world in which those rules had further eroded would be an infinitely more
insecure one if such weapons fall into the hands of terrorists who might have no
compunction about using them. To avoid such developments the report recommended
a range of urgent actions. – to encourage acceptance of the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol providing for snap
inspections, to increase cooperation between the IAEA and the CWC[1] and the Security Council on the basis of regular reports, to resume negotiations
on an intrusive regime of inspection for biological installations, and to
prepare for a biological incident or attack.
The report recognised and firmly endorsed the balance in the nuclear non-proliferation regime between the need to prevent weapons proliferation and the need to respect the right of states to develop their civil nuclear programmes. It further considered that the time had come to renew efforts to avoid the development of a new capacity for the enrichment of uranium and the separation of spent fuel to extract plutonium, given the propensity of these two technologies to provide a short cut to a weapons programme. So it urges the IAEA to negotiate an international system that would enable it to guarantee the provision of enrichment and reprocessing services at market rates, without risk of interruption to any country in full compliance with their safeguards obligations. It suggests that for a limited period, while such a scheme was under negotiation, states should agree to a voluntary moratorium on any new enrichment and reprocessing facilities. In addition to these measures it believes that next year’s review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides an opportunity which must not be missed for the accepted nuclear weapons states to give more substance to their arms reduction commitments. And the report recommended that the Security Council undertake to act in any circumstance where a non-nuclear state is attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons.
Tackling
‘soft’ threats alongside ‘hard’ threats
The Panel also realised that to face the
threats mentioned so far, the soft threats - poverty, environmental degradation,
pandemic disease, organised crime – need also to be part of the main reform
agenda. To this end, there is an urgent necessity to complete the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) to tackle development. Furthermore, the report stresses
the need to substantially increase financial resources to fuel development
programmes and to counter AIDS and other pandemic diseases.
As the report makes clear, development and
security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor
countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious
diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile
breeding-ground for other threats, including civil conflict. Even people in rich
countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat
poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Consequently,
the international community should not only view ‘soft’ threats as part of
the development agenda but also be an important component of the peace and
security agenda.
Institutional
reforms
On an institutional level, the report
recommends that the General Assembly needs to be more focused and less formulaic
in its handling of the burning issues of the hour. The Security Council needs to
be enlarged. It has set out the criteria which should guide the choice of a
wider membership. The report forwards two models. One involves the admission of
new permanent members, albeit ones without a power of veto, the other involves
the creation of a new category of longer term but still non-permanent members.
Both models involve a Council of 24 members. Both envisage a review in 2020 of
whatever arrangement is agreed. However, no consensus was agreeable on the part
of the P5 on the possible abolition of the veto power enjoyed by them for the
last 60 years.
Underpinning all this is the need for a stronger, more professional Secretariat and a Secretary-General with more control over his human resources and more authority to switch them from areas of less immediate priority, to those which urgently require boosting. The report has recommended the establishment of a second post of Deputy Secretary-General. The new incumbent would be devoted to the peace and security agenda and the present one freed up to deal more effectively with the development and administrative agenda. It would like to see a considerable re-structuring of the staff of the Secretariat with a rationalisation of the structure and full advantage taken of forthcoming retirements. It has recommended sixty additional posts to give the new Deputy Secretary-General some analytical capability and to staff a Peace-building Bureau, in particular with experts having field experience.
Criticisms
of the report
Whilst the report should be commended
for its well balanced analysis of today’s threat to peace and security, there
are aspects of the report which fall short of emphasizing the importance of
certain areas:
Improving
international relations
Few would dispute that the difficulties
the UN is experiencing are related to a deterioration of relations between
different member states, as well as US- UN relations. Therefore, it is important
that all sides show their commitment to using the United Nations system as the
main multilateral organisation for dealing with issues of international peace
and security. Since 2000 the Bush
Administration has dropped the United States government’s support of at least
five major United Nations treaties including the Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and the
International Criminal Court.
The Bush Administration’s withdrawal from the ABM treaty in 2002 was the first time a major power has withdrawn from a nuclear treaty after it had become legally binding. North Korea opted out of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty in 2003, citing new United States aggression on nuclear weapons. For any of these reforms to work the United Nations and the world community need to have an enlightened dialogue with United States to adopt alternative methods to war in order to establish peace in the world.
The
way forward
It is important to remember that no amount of systemic change at the United Nations will, in itself, be of much avail if the main protagonists do not re-double their efforts to resolve a number of long-running and still festering disputes. In that context Palestine, Kashmir and North Korea stand out a mile. There seems to be a new willingness to address all of these issues. But will there be the perseverance and the determination to see them through to a conclusion? On the answer to that question the real value of many parts of the Panel’s agenda will depend. The
Panel recommends that new enthusiasm be directed towards disarmament, and that
efforts be made to reduce the supply of nuclear weapons. They also recommend
improvements to the enforcement capacity of the Security Council and better
public health defences to combat the threat of biological weapons.
The
report is the start, not the end, of a process. This year 2005, will be a
crucial opportunity for member states to discuss and build on the
recommendations in the report, some of which will be considered by a summit of
heads of States. But building a more secure world takes much more than a report
or a summit. It will take resources commensurate with the scale of the
challenges ahead. Commitments that are long-term and sustained and, most of all,
it will take leadership from within States, and between them.
Recommendations
of Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons disarmament
21. The nuclear
weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:
(a) They must honour
their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific
measures in fulfillment of those commitments;
(b) They should
reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States.
22. The United
States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not
party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should commit
to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war including,
where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic
nuclear weapons.
23. The Security
Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a
nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon state.
24. Negotiations to
resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building measures and steps
towards disarmament.
25. States not party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a
commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament. Thus, demonstrating their
commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting
negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to
nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace
efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that
could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions
similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the
South Pacific and South-East Asia.
26. All
chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing
chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012.
27. States parties
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to
negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active
participation of the biotechnology industry.
28. The Board of
Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the
Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the
Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over
non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards.
29. Negotiations
should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an
arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III and IX of the IAEA
statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile
material to civilian nuclear users.
30. While that
arrangement is being negotiated States should, without surrendering the right
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct
uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a
time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with
a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile
materials by the current suppliers at market rates.
31. All States
should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative.
32. A State’s
notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if
necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should
resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should
be withdrawn.
33. The proposed
timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched
uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from 10 to five
years.
34. States parties
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new
bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish
binding international standards for the export of such agents.
35. The Conference
on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable
fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the
production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons
purposes.
36. The
Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly
on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any
serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the
treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
37. The Security
Council should consult with the Director-General of the World Health
Organization to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the
event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.
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This
Paper is based upon a talk given by Vijay Mehta at Friends House, London at the
Action for UN Renewal AGM.
This paper can also be accessed at www.vmpeace.org
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