The Future of NPT: Challenges and Prospects Ahead

A discussion Paper for the Seventh Review Conference, 2005 New York

Table of Contents

* The Future of NPT: Challenges and Prospects Ahead                                                          
   A discussion Paper for the Seventh Review Conference, 2005 New York

* Recommendations of Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Disarmament.
   As part of the 101 recommendations of the UN High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change

* NPT Treaty                                                                                                               

* 13 Practical Steps for Implementation                                                                     

* List of useful websites                                                                                              

The Future of NPT: Challenges and Prospects Ahead

A discussion Paper for the Seventh Review Conference, 2005 New York

Vijay Mehta

http://www.vmpeace.org/

Introduction

In May 2005, the Nuclear non-Proliferation (NPT) Review Conference in New York presents a historic opportunity to agree to a timetable to the reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. While virtually all states have signed and ratified the treaty, there is no genuine desire to comply with its articles. Hence, proliferation of nuclear technology and materials continues. The NPT has been around for three decades but we seldom seem any closer to a nuclear-free world.

However, the NPT remains a key pillar of the UN’s efforts for maintaining international peace and security - the cornerstone of the international regime for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, the regulation of technology associated with the development of such weapons, and the eventual attainment of global nuclear disarmament.

The NPT provides a framework that fixes nuclear non-proliferation at the core of world affairs and denotes a legally-binding commitment to nuclear disarmament. Ratified by 187 countries, it is the most comprehensively endorsed arms limitation and disarmament covenant, and supplies the basis from which all other related international agreements have evolved, such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The NPT entered into force in 1970.  The Treaty and the NPT verification system provided by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) make a crucial contribution to regional and international peace and security.  Notwithstanding challenges such as the South Asian nuclear tests the NPT has been successful in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.  In the 1960s, prior to the establishment of the NPT, commentators assessed that 20-25 states would develop or acquire nuclear weapons by the 1980s.  It is a measure of the NPT’s success, and the security benefits it delivers to the international community, that the spread of nuclear weapons projected in the 1960s has not been realised.

The NPT is the most widely supported arms control treaty ever. The only states never to have joined it are India, Israel and Pakistan. The NPT is not a stand-alone instrument.  It is the key component of a series of interlocking international treaties, arrangements, undertakings and norms aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons and advancing nuclear disarmament.   Other elements of this regime include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the IAEA safeguards system, the nuclear export control regimes, and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.

The Challenges Ahead

The States Parties to the NPT, is a world of contrasts – a world of serious challenges and grave perils, but also of opportunities. Cases such as North Korea and Iran, new terrorism and wars, the nuclear network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan, inadequate stockpile security, and concerns on nuclear weapon states’ commitment to disarmament have created rising doubts about the sustainability of the nonproliferation regime and disarmament.  

At its core, the NPT is an agreement based on the expression of the enlightened self-interest of countries insisting that all parties follow crucial nonproliferation rules. These rules, which are established by the Treaty, make all countries more secure by controlling the dangerous and destabilising spread of nuclear weapons. They also incorporate the important principle that parties to the Treaty should be able to enjoy the benefits that nuclear power and research can bring to mankind, provided that they follow a set of rules designed to prevent the misuse of such technology to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

The two components of this bargain, shared benefits and nonproliferation compliance, are inseparable. In the past, the international community has focused too much of its attention on benefit sharing while devoting insufficient attention to NPT compliance. As a result, the entire scheme stands today increasingly in jeopardy.

Countries that pursue their ambitions to develop nuclear weaponry under cover of an ostensibly “peaceful” nuclear program while outwardly pretending to be in compliance with the NPT, subvert the Treaty and threaten its viability. Countries which join the NPT and pay lip service to its core principles while secretly violating them are a huge challenge to the regime, and thus to the nonproliferation norms that underlie international peace and security. Such clandestine violators present difficulties to the compliance of the treaty.

Disagreement on the NPT Agenda

The struggle regarding the upcoming Review Conference (RevCon’s) agenda demonstrates the diplomatic push and pull between states advocating disarmament and those concerned about proliferation.  Part of the difficulty in adopting an agenda has been the great divide in priorities between states with weapons and states without.  Groups of Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) like the New Agenda Coalition are pressing for progress on disarmament, specifically reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. NNWS will likely promote negative security assurances, which are regarded as a pledge by the Nuclear Weapons States not to first use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. Nuclear Weapons States reject such a codified promise. 

The United Kingdom argues that existing agreements and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones already “offer Non-Nuclear Weapons States the assurances they seek. The United States is calling for tougher standards on proliferation. These include restricting sale of nuclear power facilities to nations that already possess a complete fuel cycle, and limiting peaceful nuclear cooperation to those nations that have signed the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Although it has been “sidestepped” by the PrepComs, the issue of withdrawal is likely to be on the agenda. Sergio Duarte, President-designate of the NPT 2005 Review Conference, declared his hope that the state parties would discuss a provision to make withdrawal from the treaty more difficult for countries suspected of diverting peaceful nuclear technology.

Disagreements on procedural matters in UN bodies usually signal underlying political tensions. For example, the disagreement between the United States and China over negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty versus a treaty banning weaponisation of space have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from adopting an agenda for the past six years, resulting in deadlock.  The RevCon is particularly vulnerable to such diplomatic wrangling, as its procedural rules require consensus in order to produce a final document. 

At issue is the view of the U.S. government that the international climate has altered so dramatically since the 2000 Review Conference as to invalidate its basic agreement – the 13 steps.  U.S. diplomats declared in 2003 that, “the United States no longer supports all 13 steps,” specifically ratifying the CTBT.  They have since tried to eliminate or diminish all references to the 2000 RevCon in the 2005 agenda.  According to current U.S. perspective, “The central bargain of the NPT is that if non-nuclear weapons states renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons, they may gain assistance in developing civilian nuclear power,” and that “Article VI issues that do not exist” are diverting the attention away from non-proliferation violations. This apparent denial of disarmament goals has left many NNWS feeling resentful.

Double standards on NPT won't help

Back in 1995, the NPT was renewed indefinitely, amid justified self-congratulation about how well it had stopped proliferation. Since then, though, the cold war peace dividend has been squandered.

The US is violating at least the spirit of the treaty by developing weapons such as low-yield "bunker-busting" bombs. Britain has reduced its deployment of Trident missiles but is unwilling to go further unilaterally. The nuclear weapons states are behaving as if disarmament were a voluntary concession rather than a binding obligation. Hopes for a treaty ending the production of fissile material for military purposes, promised in 2000, have faded - setting the stage for an ill-tempered five-yearly review of the NPT in New York in May.

Perhaps the greatest challenge will be how to preserve the integrity and credibility of the Treaty in the face of recent episodes that gave rise to accusations of lack of compliance on the one hand, and of what is perceived as attempts to back down from political commitments accepted only a few years ago, on the other hand. The mechanism put together by the drafters of the Treaty to ensure compliance with its non-proliferation obligations is being considered inadequate, and new constraints on the non-nuclear weapon States are being proposed. At the same time, the commitment and the will of nuclear weapon States to abide by their obligations under Article VI are being doubted and called into question. If this crisis of confidence in the good faith of its Parties continues to exist and grow, we all will have reason to fear for the longevity of the NPT.

One of the major achievements of the 2000 Review Conference was the agreement on the "unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. Under Article VI, all Parties to the NPT are committed to that objective. The reaffirmation of this commitment at the 2005 Review Conference and the promotion of progress towards nuclear disarmament in the most concrete way possible will certainly be a major objective for most NNWS.

There is an obvious need to ensure that the safeguards and verification system provided for in Article III works effectively to satisfy Parties that obligations set forth in Articles I and II are being fully complied with; at the same time, however, many have pointed out that the application of that system should not contradict the right to develop research and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as established in Article IV. This involves a difficult equilibrium, but the question must be addressed with earnestness and in good faith if Parties are to achieve a solution that takes into account proliferation concerns and legitimate aspirations for economic and social progress, as well as for technological advancement. Several ideas and proposals have been made to reinforce the safeguards regime, and they will certainly be in the forefront of the discussions.

The Threat of Terrorism

The forthcoming Review Conference should also address firmly the new and serious challenges to international peace and security and to the non-proliferation regime, which arose as a consequence of the emergence of terrorism as a tool of political extremism. This is a subject of special preoccupation to several Parties, and indeed concerns the whole international community. Although specifically dealing with States, not individuals, the NPT has an important role to play in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by so-called non-State actors. All Parties to the instrument have equal responsibilities in that regard. The reduction and eventual elimination of the threat posed by international terrorism, however, cannot be achieved solely through the NPT. Other tools and mechanisms exist, and some have already been put in motion. It is important that such mechanisms be multilaterally agreed, non-discriminatory in character and universal in their application, rather than simply arrangements among a limited number of willing, or willful, Parties. Some seem to think that by avoiding tedious and time consuming diplomatic negotiations questions considered to be of high priority would be tackled in a more efficient and flexible manner.

In the long run, however, bypassing multilateral institutions in favor of ad hoc mechanisms risks creating instances of limited or questionable legitimacy like the Proliferation Security Initiative. They lack the necessary broad membership and support that makes treaties and organisations lasting and respected. The price for quick action may prove to be too high in terms of the erosion of credibility of traditional international institutions and instruments.

Future Prospects

Recommendations of UN High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change

Concern over threats to international peace and security and the need to evaluate the policies and institutions that address these threats prompted the Secretary-General of the United Nations to form a high-level panel to provide a comprehensive view about the way forward on these critical issues.

The nuclear dimension of the threat, the report goes on, is proliferation – the spread of nuclear weapons among States. For the majority of Parties to the NPT proliferation means not only the acquisition of such weapons by States currently not possessing them but also the qualitative improvement of arsenals, resulting from the continuing reliance by the nuclear-weapon States on defence doctrines predicated on their use. Such doctrines provide impetus to the drive to improve their destructive capability in a way that makes such use more "acceptable" and thus more likely.

The Report also addressed current concerns about the goal of achieving a more effective non-proliferation regime and the right of all NPT signatories to develop civilian nuclear industries. Its suggestions range from the recognition of the Model Additional Protocol as the standard for IAEA safeguards to action by the Security Council in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with NPT obligations. They further urged negotiations on guarantees of supply of fissile material by the IAEA and the institution of a moratorium on further construction of enrichment or reprocessing facilities.

So what steps can states take to restart disarmament? The UN high-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change makes the following recommendations:

Further Recommendations of IAEA and Conclusion

To address the body of problems, Dr ElBaradei has made a number of proposals for strengthening the NPT. These ’seven steps’ - none of which seeks to amend the NPT - encapsulate many of the High-Level Panel’s major recommendations for the non-proliferation regime:

1. A five-year moratorium on the construction of facilities intended for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation

2. The conversion of existing nuclear research reactors operating with highly enriched uranium to ones using low enriched uranium.

3. The establishment of the additional protocol to the NPT as the norm for verifying compliance by the IAEA

4. The strengthening of the measures taken by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to deal with withdrawals from the NPT

5. An increased effort by states to act upon UNSC resolution 1540, which instructs states to pursue and prosecute any illicit trading in nuclear material and technology

6. The acceleration of nuclear disarmament by Nuclear Weapon States

7. An acknowledgement of the link between regional instability and the perceived need of states affected by regional instability to acquire nuclear weapons

Today’s security environment requires an comprehensive and robust global nonproliferation strategy. The NPT’s future success depends on universal compliance with tighter rules to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, more effective regional security strategies and renewed progress toward fulfillment of the nuclear weapon states’ NPT disarmament obligations.

The NPT embodies one of the best security bargains ever struck, bringing together 186 countries against nuclear weapons with a collective force that the United States could not muster on its own and provides a framework and forum for handling the problems that continually arise. The United States has plenty of nonproliferation programs. We need nonproliferation partners, and the NPT helps supply them.

For the achievement of peace, disarmament and security, all parties to the treaty need to follow the UN High-level Report and implement the IAEA recommendations. Only then can the dream of disarmament and a nuclear free world can be realised leading to the successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference 2005.

Recommendations of Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons disarmament

21. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:

(a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;

(b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons.

23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon State.

24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament.

25. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia.

26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012.

27. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry.

28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today’s standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards.

29. Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users.

30. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates.

31. All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative.

32. A State’s notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn.

33. The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from 10 to five years.

34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents.

35. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes.

36. The Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

37. The Security Council should consult with the Director-General of the World Health Organization to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty", considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the conse­quent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that die benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties of the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discon­tinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between the States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accord­ance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency s safeguards system for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peacefuluses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall be applied to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any here.

2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.

3. The safeguards required by this article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with the article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the interna­tional exchange of nuclear material for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. ForStates depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

Article IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or in international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Article V

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude an charge for research and development Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special interna­tional agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

Article VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Article VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

Article VIII

1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties -which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any Party upon deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragrapn 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1,1967.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or of accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article X

1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized it supreme interests.

2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty, DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this first day of July one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

13 Practical steps

EXCERPTED FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995

Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1.    The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2.   A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on / Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4.   The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5.   The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6.    An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7.   The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8.    The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9.   Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

*     Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

*     Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

*     The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

*     Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

*     A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

*     The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12.  Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13.The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Lists of Useful Websites

Abolition 2000 Network                                                                www.abolition2000.org

Acronym Institute                                                                               www.acronym.org.uk

Arms Reduction Coalition                                                                              www.arcuk.org

British American Security Information Council (BASIC)                        www.basicint.org

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation                                                www.russfound.org

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament                                                           www.cnduk.org

Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA)                              www.disarmament.un.org

Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in space       www.space4peace.org

International Peace Bureau                                                                               www.ipb.org

International Atomic Energy Agency                                                              www.iaea.org

International Network of Engineers and Scientist against Proliferation     www.inesap.org

Int'l Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms                                    www.ialana.org

MEDACT                                                                                                   www.medact.org

Middle Powers Initiative                                                                 www.middlepowers.org

Movement for the Abolition of War (MAW)                         www.abolishwar.freeuk.com

NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security                        www.disarm.igc.org

New Agenda Coalition                                                              abolition2000uk.gn.apc.org

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation/Abolition 2000                                www.wagingpeace.org

Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs                              www.pugwash.org

Reaching Critical Will                                                             www.reachingcriticalwill.org

United Nations Association UK                                                                 www.una-uk.org

Verification Research, Training Information Centre (VERTIC)                  www.vertic.org

World Court Project UK                                                                      http://wcp.gn.apc.org