UN Institutional Reform

How can we make the Security Council more representative and work towards abolishing the veto?

A discussion paper for the panel on UN reforms

World Peace Forum

Vancouver, Canada.
25 June 2006, 9.00am - 1.00pm

4. The General Assembly. Regaining its powers and claiming new responsibilities.

7. The role of Security Council in contributing to international peace and security

8. Towards a new Security Council with a balanced and representative membership.

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Vijay Mehta is an author, peace and development activist. His latest book, The United Nations and Its Future in the 21st Century, discuss ideas about the UN’s central role in contributing to international peace and security. He is president of VM Centre for Peace and Chair of Arms Reduction Coalition, and World Disarmament Campaign and Vice Chair of Action for UN Renewal. He is also a founder member of the New School of Athens. He is a member of the National Council of Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

In my speech today we will examine how can we make the Security Council more representative and work towards abolishing the veto? What ere the origin of veto and why it needs to be modified? Why we need to enhance the power of the general assembly? Why the Security Council’s role is important in contributing to international peace and security and we will see how we can work towards abolishing veto and making Security Council more balanced, representative and democratic.

One of the most tragic outcomes of the United Nations Summit of world leaders in 2005 was the failure to agree on the reforms of the Security Council. It remains as ever a club of the privileged which leads to democratic deficit as has been said by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General.

After the second world war, multilateral security institutions were purposively designed by the victors of the latest grand war, perhaps with the objective to “lock-in” favorable institutional structures that would outlast the immediate power advantages that resulted from the last war. The UNSC is the quintessential example of this: it granted permanent membership and veto power to the five “victors” of World War II, while excluding the defeated powers and raising an entry barrier for potential rising powers.

The 15 member Security Council should be enlarged to make it more representative. The permanent 5 members of the Security Council should relinquish their veto - wielding power (held for 58 years) in favour of democratic decision making. The Security Council need fairer representation of the geopolitical realities of the present day world in which the UN membership has almost quadrupled to 191. It should include India (With over 1 billion people) and continents of Latin America and Africa should have representation on Security Council. There is a case for Japan and Germany to be included because of their tremendous support and contribution for the UN system. The decisions of Security Council should be made by majority voting and not by veto.

Today’s United Nations is vastly different from the Organization that emerged from the San Francisco conference more than 60 years ago. Its normative work remains important and substantive. In the past decade however, it has undergone a dramatic operational expansion in a wide range of fields, from human rights to development. Most notable has been a fourfold increase in peacekeeping. The United Nations today has a wide range of new missions, a $5 billion peacekeeping budget and 80,000 peacekeepers in the field – including more than twice as many civilian staff as are employed at Headquarters in New York. The United Nations, in short, is no longer a conference-servicing Organization located in a few headquarters locations. It is a highly diverse Organization working worldwide to improve the lives of people who need help.

Such a radically expanded range of activities calls for a radical overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat – its rules, structure, systems and culture. Up to now, that has not happened. The staff members of the Organization – its most valuable resource – are increasingly stretched. Our management systems simply do not do them justice.

To achieve this goal, the United Nations Secretariat and Member States need to combine the current reviews of oversight systems and internal justice – both of which are essential to building a stronger, more dynamic and more transparent United Nations but are currently proceeding on separate tracks – with major reforms in six other broad areas, all closely interrelated. The High Level Panel Report 2005 provides detailed proposals for reform in those six areas, as well as in the area of change management itself.

No institution is perfect. The UN was established immediately after the worst war in history. Its role model, the League of Nations, failed because nations were reluctant to give up sovereignty; although all co-operative efforts entail some diminution of the power to exercise self- interest. This was explicitly recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. The 51 nations that signed the Charter stated in the preamble

“We the peoples of the United Nations (are) determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…”.

In a world that has become ever more complex those ideals have been forgotten. In recent years some major powers, released from the paralysis of the cold war, have embarked on their own campaign of military aggression, ignoring their own promises and the intentions of those who framed the Charter.

On recent occasions leading members of the UN Security Council, which is the body charged with maintaining peace and security, have gone to war without the support of a UN resolution. As the UN Secretary general, Kofi Annan, said in a speech in 2003,

“We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than in 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded…” Up to now, he said, if nations wanted to use force they needed the unique legitimacy provided by the UN. “Some say this understanding is now longer tenable, since an armed attack with weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time”.

The Secretary General followed his 2003 statement with a report ‘In Larger Freedom (April 2005). He was adamant that on the use of force the UN must seek a consensus on when and how force can be used to defend international peace and security. He said that

“In recent years this issue has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed on about whether states have the right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats.; whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right – or perhaps the obligation - to use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable crimes”.

We now know that those who launched their own pre-emptive attack on Iraq misled the world about an imminent attack and the need to obstruct it. The reassertion of the primacy of international law under the Charter, in support of the Geneva Conventions and other treaties of the 20^th century, is the most important action required from the UN and its supporters. Yet this is a daunting task.

According to the deputy secretary-general Mark Malloch Brown, "The kernel of the crisis of UN is rooted in the failure of Security Council reform, the Iraq war, and how the organisation was established -- all of these things in the context of a major redistribution of power in the world and political economy."

He said the United Nations has not adjusted itself to this in governance terms -- and particularly to rising new powers such as Brazil, South Africa or India -- to be more unrepresentative today than it was two years ago, 10 years ago or 60 years ago.

In 2000 the authors of ‘Searching for Peace’, Johan Galtung and Carl G Jacobsen explained

“International law is a misnomer, if not an oxymoron. There is no international government or legislature with the authority to promulgate international law. There is no court with a universal mandate … or a global enforcement agency”.

As the authors say, these are “conventions of mutual advantage” signed by those who value them and who are willing to discard them if their advantage means a change of policy. Of course powerful countries like the US and other permanent members can ride roughshod over international rules.

After September 2005, many reforms are still needed. Without these reforms the UN will limp along, unable to deal with the most serious issues that at present are ignored.

Many reforms are long overdue as stated by Erskine Childers and former Secretary-General U Thant.

Erskine Childers (Ireland) worked for the UN in senior positions for 22 years. He was the first president of the Forum for UN Renewal, forerunner of the present campaign. In ‘A Time beyond Warnings’ (1993) Childers conceded that his proposals were “to improve on the already extraordinary; to strengthen a System that has already recorded breathtaking advances on the great canvas of world history”.

Many years earlier, in 1969, one of the most highly regarded UN leaders, former Secretary-General U Thant, warned

“I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary General, that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion and to supply the required momentum to development efforts”.

Eliminate Big-Power Aggression

In addition to the reassertion of the primacy of international law under the Charter there are also many other pressing questions to be answered by the international community before the UN can regain its place as the fountain-head of peace and security in the world.

Other topics to be discussed include the dominant position of the five permanent members, no longer the sole major powers in the world; the re-emergence of Germany and Japan since the end of the war; and the coming development of states such as India, Brazil and Indonesia who are changing the line-up of world powers. We also require the restatement of international law and the return to the proper functioning of the UN Security Council as the sole arbiter of the right to go to war. Finally, it is essential to stabilise the membership of the Council.

One of the tasks must be to see that the Council properly represents those powers that are economically able to assist the Secretary General in carrying out his (or her) functions in maintaining world peace and security. Such stability must also include a regional balance of permanent or semi-permanent members as it does already with its two-year rotating membership. There can be no place for a council which has three permanent members from Europe while South America and Africa have none.

4. The General Assembly – regaining its powers and claiming new responsibilities.

The Charter makes it clear that the General Assembly of all member states is the primary UN body. Article 15 says that “the Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council…and from the other Organs of the United Nations”.

The chief limitation on its powers comes from Article 12 which lays down that when the Security Council is exercising its functions in dealing with matters of peace and security the Assembly shall refrain from making any recommendations. While this is a necessary condition it should be modified by a new rule which should be mutually agreed by both institutions.

In cases such as the management of relations with Iraq, which began after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and have no sign of ending till now, the General Assembly has been virtually silenced. It must be possible for an interregnum to be agreed between them so that the stewardship of the Security Council can be investigated and if necessary challenged.

Instead the powers of the General Assembly should be enhanced so that it can play a vital role debating and deciding important international issues. At present each autumn it is faced with a daunting agenda and same resolutions year after year are put forward for discussion. Its agenda should be streamlined in order to devote more time to pressing threats and challenges facing the world today.

The United Nations General Assembly should convene a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, to meet after thorough preparation. This World Summit should also discuss and decide on reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN disarmament machinery.

Uniting for Peace

Some resolutions of the General Assembly have great force and are revived in times of crisis. The ‘Uniting for Peace ‘ resolution of 1950 has been used to over-ride the monopoly of the Security Council and to some extent the power of the veto. Over half the membership of the Assembly is required to achieve a debate on such a resolution.

Early in 2003, Before the Iraq war began in 2003, an attempt was made to hold a debate. Some 59-member states were prepared to call for a meeting, although 96 members would have been required. The war came too soon for a debate. Another obstacle for many of the smaller members was a demand by the United States that they withhold their support for a vote, warning them of dire consequences in their relations with that country.

Governments that want to lead greater intervention by the international community know that there is strong support for humanitarian intervention. Some governments use this sympathy in order to as a way to gain co-operation for their own favoured actions.

These may be by introducing sanctions to put pressure on recalcitrant governments; if this fails they may opt for military action. In such cases support from the Security Council is important.

In two recent cases, in 1999 and 2003, military action in Yugoslavia and Iraq was taken by a coalition of UN member states without UN support. These decisions were controversial, and whatever the moral implications have badly damaged the UN.

Pressure on the UN to act is understandably very strong where the civilian population is suffering from internal strife in states where the government is unable or unwilling change its policies. As a result the High Level Panel made recommendations that should lead to UN-supported intervention in appropriate cases.

Chapter V11 of the UN Charter on Internal Threats and the Responsibility to Protect deals with the need for the wider community to come to the assistance of people within a non-performing state. But Article 2.7 in Article 1 forbids intervention “in matters that essentially within the jurisdiction of any state…”

Thus, before intervention under the auspices of the UN can be supported it is necessary for the Security Council to establish the need for intervention, confirm the inability of the state concerned to co-operate, and satisfy its members that intervention would be legitimate. One decision already made by the Council is the imperative of intervention in cases of genocide. This puts the onus on the Council to decide that genocide is occurring. In the case of Rwanda, in which a UN peace-keeping force was already present, the Council declined to support the allegation of genocide and thus refused to send reinforcements. This was an example where intervention should have been mandatory.

On the general issue the High Level Panel had little to say in detail on the question of responsibility to protect. It listed five recent cases for intervention: Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan.

Each of these cases was different. Intervention in Somalia was approved by the UN, which appointed the US as its agent. This intervention failed to restore peace. In Bosnia UN forces had an inadequate mandate or forces’; allowed to monitor the civil war by the Yugoslav government the UN commander was given barely a quarter of the forces he requested and the mission failed.

In Kosovo the determination of NATO commanders, led by US forces, to take military action - although they had received no mandate from the Security Council. This resulted in the destruction of much of the Serbian infrastructure, including civilian casualties.

Agreement has been reached between the UN Secretary-General and opposing forces in Darfur for intervention by a UN backed force and this is awaited. These examples should serve to encourage caution before embarking on military intervention in a sovereign state. As the High Level Panel concluded:

“The primary focus should be on assisting the cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort”.

It will be seen that although endorsing the responsibility of the international community to protect civilian populations under great pressure and the essential use of force in confirmed cases of genocide. The Panel realised that each case must be treated on its unique situation – something that emerges clearly from the cases cited above.

One of the traditional stumbling blocks has been the existence of the veto power of the Council’s permanent members, which enables any one of the so-called P- 5 (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, China and Russia) to block any resolution that is not merely procedural in nature. The veto is considered fundamentally unjust by a majority of States and is thought to be the main reason why the Council failed to respond adequately to humanitarian crises such as in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2004). It is thus not surprising that most States wish to abolish or restrain the veto. Equally unsurprising is the fact that the P-5, whose concurring votes and ratifications are required for even the smallest amendment of the UN Charter (pursuant to articles 108 and 109) reject any limitation of the veto outright. For this reason, many States have abandoned radical reform proposals and have adopted a pragmatic approach, pleading in particular for voluntary restraint on the veto use. Furthermore, the focus of the discussion seems to have shifted to the question whether the possible enlargement of the number of permanent seats should result in a parallel expansion of the veto or not.

Yet one cannot afford to be overly pragmatic on this point. The approaching reform process presents a unique opportunity, which will not be repeated in the near future. During the past sixty years, the UN Charter was amended only three times, including one time in 1963 to increase the number of elected members on the Security Council from 6 to 10. What is at stake is the very survival, legitimacy and efficiency of the collective security system in the 21st century. Therefore at least a substantive debate on the veto power is needed.

"The veto provision was an absolute condition for US participation in the United Nations. The superpowers would not be subject to any collective coercion. The veto ensured that the General Assembly could not act against any of the permanent five."

In other words, the P5 were and would be a law unto themselves. No wonder the Mexican delegate at the Charter adopting meeting at San Francisco in 1945 ruefully concluded that, "The mice would be disciplined but the lions would be free."

The dynamics of international life have always been complex. Still, idealism gave birth to the UN after World War II. The assumption that the foundations of the new international order would be laid and secured without hitch, soon proved illusory. The UN has avoided the fate of the League of Nations which wound up in 1945. Its members automatically became members of the UN, including India.

The Security Council is by no means a democratic body. Its composition reflects the world of 1945, not 2006. In 2005, the UN celebrated its 60th birthday. It was hoped that the UN Charter would be revised in a meaningful way, so that the Security Council would become truly representative of the new century. That was not to be. The US made it clear that the reform and expansion of the Security Council was not a priority for them.

From the beginning the veto has been an anachronism. It has prevented the membership of the General Assembly, now over 190, from making many crucial decisions. The effect of the veto is to destroy its democratic nature.

In its proposals the High Level Panel was strongly against any extension of the veto. They recognized that the veto “had an important function in reassuring the UN’s most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded”. While they could see “no practical way of changing the existing members’ veto powers” they recognized that it was out of tune in an increasingly democratic age and urged that its use be limited by voluntary action to matters of vital national interests. When we realize that veto powers are reminiscent of a colonial era we must look forward to a time when the national interests of five members are no longer considered more important than those of the other 186!

Constitutional decisions in the General Assembly require not only a two thirds majority of members but the positive votes of each of the permanent members. Their power of veto is exercised across the board in decisions of both the Security Council and the Assembly.

A proposal to fully abolish the veto at present would be a mistake. One of its positive advantages is as a safety valve to prevent a serious clash between permanent members. Many states work within alliances. It is essential that nothing is done that would help to precipitate a dangerous encounter.

After the ‘non-vote’ before the attack on Iraq by US and UK forces in 2003 it was clear that one of the leaders (the US) responsible in the past for casting frequent vetoes, was prepared to take military action without the mandate of a UN Security Council resolution. This could be described as a ‘reverse’ veto. This arose from the warning by another permanent member (France) that under certain circumstances it might veto a resolution supporting war on Iraq.

The UN Charter says that every decision must have the affirmative vote of all five permanent members. Article 27 (3) of the Charter reads

“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters (except procedural votes) shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring vote of the permanent members…” where the veto is already modified. For practical reasons in the early years of the United Nations the five permanent members agreed that abstention from a vote would amount to agreement.

Ever since the Great Powers gave birth to the United Nations, the veto debate has been extremely emotionally charged. Often the debates have resembled those of a squabbling couple, with both parties – the P-5 and other UN Member States – presenting their views and not giving much attention to the validity of the other’s arguments. As the veto again turns out to be the decisive issue of Charter reform, it is time for the two sides to get back on speaking terms. Non-Council UN Member States should abandon claims that the veto has become obsolete since the end of the Cold War and recognise that “trying to get rid of the veto is like trying to get rid of politics”. These States have to admit that the United Nations cannot function properly without the support of the world’s most powerful States. Therefore, safeguarding the essential interests of the latter States is the necessary price to pay. Moreover, it should be conceded that the Security Council is not the only UN body in need of reform and that occasionally objectionable voting behaviour is not restricted to the P-5 alone.

The permanent members on their side – including possible newcomers – must recognise that their primary responsibilities with regard to international peace and security require them to use the veto with caution, taking account not only of their national interests, but also the interests of the wider international community. More importantly, given the growing importance attached to the concept of ‘democracy’ in UN circles, the permanent members should make some effort to make the Council not only more representative, but also to make it more democratically accountable. In this regard, the proposals spelled out in this contribution (rejection of the veto in Chapter VI issues, creation of an accountability mechanism and the introduction of an overruling mechanism with regard to large-scale massacres of civilians) would certainly strengthen the legitimacy of a 21st century Security Council. Permanent members should understand that such measures are not a sacrifice on their part, but rather an investment in a better and safer world.

7. The role of the UN Security Council in contributing to international peace and security

UN Security Council has subsidiary bodies for maintaining international peace and security. These are: Peace Building Commission, Sanctions Committee, Counter-Terrorism Committee, 1540 Committee, UN Compensation Commission, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee.

While the UN General Assembly and organs under it have been deeply engaged in the task of policy-making and negotiations regarding arms control and disarmament (Article 11:1 of the UN Charter), the Security Council has concerned itself principally with specific cases. It has been pragmatic in deciding upon the degree of practical engagement to be taken in the various cases, allowing it to be influenced by the particular circumstances in each case. Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 1991 Gulf War, the Security Council determined that all Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles of a range greater than 150 km should be eradicated (Security Council Resolution 687). The Council engaged deeply and directly in the process of inspection and disarmament throughout the 1990s and up to and including the Iraq war in 2003.

In the case of North Korea, which was referred to the Council in 1993 by the IAEA Board of Governors on the ground that the country had violated its safeguards agreement, the Council adopted no sanctions but urged its members ‘to make appropriate efforts’. In pursuance of this recommendation the US engaged in discussions that in 1994 led to an ‘Agreed Framework’ with North Korea. The Council took no action on North Korea’s notice of withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, and recent efforts to find a solution to the proliferation problems posed by North Korea have been centred on talks in Beijing without any link to the Council.

In 1998, the Council adopted unanimously a resolution condemning the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests (Resolution 1172). In 2003, the agreement reached by the US and the UK with Libya about the termination of illegal Libyan programmes of weapons of mass destruction was not reported to the Security Council.

So far in 2006, the world community has been divided about whether or not the Security Council should take action regarding the violations by Iran of its safeguards agreements and the suspicions of an intention on the part of Iran to proceed from a programme of uranium enrichment to a programme of weapon development.

Article 26 of the UN Charter prescribes that the Council shall be responsible for formulating plans for ‘the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments’ in order to promote the maintenance of peace and security with the least diversion of resources for armaments, and Article 47:1 makes reference to a ‘disarmament’ role for the Council. Yet, the Council has not fulfilled this role. While the conditions of the Cold War might explain the passivity in the past it might be questioned whether there is today any good reason why the Council, which comprises as permanent members the states with the world’s largest diversion of resources for armaments, should not embark upon the role laid upon it. The question may be the more justified since, in the Post-Cold War period, the Council has gone beyond measures applying to specific cases and made – welcome – efforts to prevent non-nuclear- weapon states and non-state actors from acquiring Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). In January 1992, following a summit-level meeting, the Security Council declared through a Presidential Statement that:

‘The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end.’

Under Article 39 of the UN Charter, any determination by the Council that a situation or action constitutes a threat to international peace and security allows the Council to decide under Chapter VII of the Charter on measures, including economic and military sanctions, which are binding. Accordingly, the statement was – and remains – an important signal to the world that the Council will consider itself competent to take a wide range of action in any future case of the proliferation of WMD. Of course, notice that it can take action is not the same as notice that it will take action.

As noted above, the case of Libya’s breach of the NPT was not taken to the Council in 2003 but was handled through negotiations between the UK, the US and Libya. Equally important is the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1540 in April 2004. Here the position expressed in the Presidential Statement of 1992 was affirmed in a formal Council resolution, which decided with binding effect that all UN member states:

‘shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their means of delivery in particular for terrorist purposes …’

In this and other similar resolutions, the Security Council has moved beyond the realm of deciding on measures to be taken by member states in specific cases and prescribed what they must do in a large and diverse category of cases. Moreover, it established machinery to supervise the implementation of the required measures.

The action illustrates the great potential power of the Security Council to deal not only with specific acute cases but also generally with questions of WMD, disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism – indeed to ‘legislate’ for the world: member states are obliged under Article 25 of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. There is no right of reservation or opting out.

The primary responsibility placed upon the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security is thus matched by the authority that is given to it and that can be exercised to reduce the risk of WMD, whether in the hands of the five permanent members or other members of the United Nations, or non-state actors. This broad authority also raises some questions. It makes the Council legislator, judge and enforcer. All 191 UN member states could become obliged to act in accordance with injunctions that could be decided by as few as nine Council members. Is the Council sufficiently representative of the world to carry such responsibility, or does the composition need to be improved? Do new rules, or at least practices, need to be developed to ensure adequate consultation between the members of the organization that will be bound by decisions, and the members of the Security Council that will take the decisions?

The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to reduce and eliminate threats of weapons of mass destruction – whether they are linked to existing arsenals, proliferation or terrorists. It should take up for consideration any withdrawal from or breach of an obligation not to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

Making use of its authority under the Charter to take decisions with binding effect for all members, the Council may, inter alia: require individual states to accept effective and comprehensive monitoring, inspection and verification. It requires member states to enact legislation to secure global implementation of specific rules or measures; and decide, as instance of last resort, on the use of economic or military enforcement measures.

Before UN reform has made the Security Council more representative of the UN membership, it is especially important that binding decisions should be preceded by effective consultation to ensure that they are supported by the membership of the UN and will be accepted and respected.

8. Towards a new Security Council with a balanced and representative membership

Sixty years after the birth of the United Nations, UN reform is high on the international political agenda. One of the most controversial issues, if not the single most sensitive one, concerns the structure and practice of the Security Council as the primary actor regarding international peace and security. Indeed, criticism of the Council’s lack of representativeness and transparency has not diminished in recent years, despite a shift towards more openness. On the contrary, as the Council has become ever more active, criticism has increased correspondingly.

The High Level Panel asserted that “no change to the composition of the Security Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in the future”. They proposed a review of the composition of the Council in 2020. This is too far ahead; urgent reforms are wanted now.

The two indicative recommendations for the reform of the membership by the Panel were not enough.

Size. Adding just nine new members to the current 15 would not nearly match the growth of the total UN membership since the last change. In proposal ‘A’ the panel recommended only three new 2-year members; in ‘B’ only one. This is quite inadequate and undemocratic.

Balance. Adding more new permanent members to the existing numbers would not address the need to recognize the claims of states permanently excluded.

‘Shorthold’ tenancies are best. The alternative proposal for new longer-term elected membership would enable a more equitable regional balance. The apparent arbitrary proposal of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil suggested by some has antagonized their neighbours without establishing a regional balance.

The Security Council should be enlarged to at least 30 members of which 20 should be 2 year short-term members chosen by their regions. The 10 existing 2-year states have shown their dedication and judgement, often bravely declining to support contentious proposals. They are the democratic face of the Security Council, mostly elected by their own regional organizations.

The proposal for new longer-term members should be on a rotating basis of 4/5 years, chosen by their regions from among states able to give the UN financial and logistic support, including where needed, assistance with its military needs. They should also have the right to stand for re-election.

A radical proposal that should not be condemned out of hand is that in the first election of new longer term members the five permanent members should switch to a similar time-limited tenure.

In successive elections these and the elected members would be able to stand for a further four years, with no restriction on their right to stand in future elections. In this way the present permanent members would be guaranteed four more years and retain eligibility for further terms.

While this may be one of the strongest of this paper’s recommendations, it is looking further into the future; to a time when full democracy comes to the UN.

The two year tenure for the short-term members of the Council is barely enough for them to acclimatize to Council procedures before ending their tenure. Some arrangement should be devised so that their representatives are enabled to attend a number of Council sessions during the year prior to taking their seat.

These changes would make the Security Council more representative both in its size and its representative nature. Enlargement to 30 which would double the present membership would also make it less likely to make decisions out of sympathy with the views of UN member states.

Another reform of Security Council and General Assembly should be that member states of UN should send elected politicians or peoples assemblies to represent on behalf of their country instead of the present system of appointing bureaucrats.

The future of the UN lies in it as a major contributor of people and ideas. UN should mobilize international civil society and global public opinion to carry forward a vision for a just and fairer world. Its strength is evident from the fact that when the United Nations passes a resolution, it is seen as speaking for humanity as a whole, thus giving it unique legitimacy and support for an action to be taken by a country. 191 member states should embark on a reform agenda for security council which will make UN accountable, transparent and democratic decision making body, an organisation fit for facing challenges and threats of 21st Century successfully.

Both models for Security Council expansion contained in the High-Level Panel Report were deemed to have both advantages and disadvantages. There was agreement, however that the Council should be expanded to increase the representation of developing countries and the chief financial contributors to the UN.

For the restriction of the Security Council veto so that the veto is applied neither to situations related to genocide nor to the process of appointing the Secretary-General. A review to be undertaken of which matters may be considered procedural in nature and thus exempt from the veto, taking as its basis the reports of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly During the 1940s.

As a longer-term objective, to seek the restriction of the veto to Chapter VII resolutions and, eventually, its abolition. A stronger role is advocated for the General Assembly in the area of peace and security.

Only by an effort on this scale – a management reform as broad as it is deep – can we create a United Nations Secretariat that is fully equipped to implement all its mandates, using the resources of its Member States wisely and accounting for them fully, and winning the trust of the broader world community. In an age when more and more of the problems facing humanity are global and the world has more and more need for a global institution through which to forge and implement global strategies, it is more than ever necessary for the United Nations to live up to the promise of its Charter – and, above all, to the demands and hopes of present and future generations.

	United Nations, ‘Investing in the united Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide’ Report of the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, (UN, 7 March 2006) (http://www.un.org/reform/investing-in-un.html)
	Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, ‘The WMDC Report: Weapons of Terror. Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms’ (May 2006) Chaired by Hans Blix (www.wmdcommission.org )
	Vijay Mehta, ‘The United Nations and its Future in the 21st Century,’ (Spokesman, 2005) (www.spokesmanbooks.com )